Essays on the Economic Consequences of Capital Controls by Nugent, Richard J, III
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
9-2019 
Essays on the Economic Consequences of Capital Controls 
Richard J. Nugent III 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3330 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
Essays on the Economic Consequences of Capital Controls
by
Richard Joseph George Nugent III
A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Economics in partial fulfillment of the




Richard Joseph George Nugent III
All Rights Reserved
iii
This manuscript has been read and accepted by the Graduate Faculty in Economics in
satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
Professor Sangeeta Pratap







The City University of New York
iv
Abstract
Essays on the Economic Consequences of Capital Controls
by
Richard Joseph George Nugent III
Advisor: Professor Sangeeta Pratap
This dissertation consists of three chapters. In Chapter One, we review the literature on the
economic consequences of capital controls. Capital controls are advocated as second-best
policy in the presence of a pecuniary externality. Restricting capital inflows as a prudential
tool during economic booms may distort the efficient allocation of capital but it invokes
precautionary saving behavior so that agents do not overborrow. The financial crises that are
fueled by capital market distortions can be mitigated by the use of prudential capital controls,
heightened during the boom and released during the bust. The empirical evidence on capital
controls has revealed that they are useful for pushing the maturity composition of capital
flows toward the long-term end, generating monetary independence through interest rate
differentials, reducing the share of bank loans denominated in foreign currencies, improving
economic resilience, and to a lesser extent, reducing exchange rate pressures. There is a
small but growing body of evidence that capital controls incur high costs for firms and can
cause spillovers at the country level heeding calls for coordination.
In Chapter Two, we evaluate financial stability and cash flows management objectives of
capital controls in the context of four capital control events: removing or imposing controls on
capital inflows and removing or imposing controls on capital outflows. Using the synthetic
control method, we solve the endogeneity problem between the decision the use capital
controls and the outcomes of interest. We find new evidence that capital controls are not
consistently effective in reaching financial stability outcomes but are consistent in reaching
v
cash flows management outcomes. We compare our results to estimates using difference-in-
difference and carry out placebo analysis.
In Chapter Three, I evaluate the effect of short-term capital controls on direct investment.
Capital controls remain a common approach to capital flows management. Meanwhile, the
IMF has revised its position regarding selective use capital controls. However, the effects
of granular variation in capital controls by asset category and direction of flow are not
fully documented. Using a new dataset on capital control measures, I find that countries
using capital controls on short-term capital inflows receive a higher level of direct investment
inflows, and that this effect is decreasing in the country’s growth rate. I show that this result
is consistent with the interpretation that the capital control serves as a signal of stability in
slower-growing countries.
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Chapter 1
Literature Review on the Economic
Consequences Of Capital Controls
The literature on the economic consequences of capital controls is vast and evolving. Capital
controls are a category of international financial policy that restrict capital mobility between
residents and non-residents. The most useful way to think about capital control is a tax on
international borrowing or lending. A common motive for using a capital control is to stem
a surge of capital inflows. The motives for capital controls vary widely, from improving
macroeconomic conditions (Magud et al., 2018) to correcting capital market distortions (En-
gel, 2012). Capital controls have been implemented using a wide range of policy instruments,
and have increased in relative frequency following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.
In this chapter, we survey the recent literature on the economic consequences of capital
controls. We begin by looking at the use of capital controls historically. Next, we study the
motives for capital controls and their effectiveness in reaching these motives. Finally, we
discuss the evidence on the complications of using capital controls multilaterally and at the
firm level.
1
CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 2
1.1 HISTORY
The high level of financial globalization in the 21st century is not unique. Financial glob-
alization fueled by the gold standard accelerated trade in capital flows at the turn of the
20th century. Upon reaching new heights, international trade in capital flows was brought
to a halt under conditions brought on by World War I in 1914. Capital controls were first
imposed in many countries during this time. Bosman (1998) reports the measures were
used to retard the repatriation of capital so that foreign exchange could be used to purchase
strategic imports and as means of raising revenue via inflation as well as taxing wealth.
Although the Roaring 20’s would award increases in capital mobility, depression in the
1930’s and the subsequent world war would again disable the international financial system.
Deflation spread globally after 1929. Production and incomes fell, mounting heightened dif-
ficulty for struggling countries to maintain the pegged exchange rates inscribed at the time.
By the mid 1930’s, most abandoned the gold-exchange standard, adopting instead a vari-
ety of exchange rate arrangements. Neely (1999) explains that exchange rate controls were
the most common of the 1930’s exchange rate arrangements. Exchange rate controls are
restrictions on purchases and sales of foreign and domestic currency at market rates. This
particular kind of control was put in place to protect the economy from the effects of short-
term capital flows and balance-of-payment pressures. A report published by the League of
Nations confirms that countries imposed the exchange rate controls to protect the economy
against destabilizing forces stemming from international financial markets1 During the inter-
war period, the potential for outflows subsided. Most countries nonetheless maintained the
exchange controls in place. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) predict some countries may have had
feared floating. The exchange controls in place alongside a pegged rate provided countries a
1League of Nations report first indicated countries’ motivation for exchange rate controls (League of
Nations, 1938). Additional studies followed confirming the League of Nations report (Ellis, 1946, 1940).
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stable nominal anchor.
Following World War II, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement
signed at Bretton Woods provided for a system of international finance marked by strong
capital immobility with an explicit function for capital controls2, the gold standard, and
fixed exchange rates. In fact a key proponent of capital controls, John Maynard Keynes,
served as a key architect of the Articles. In 1971 after many failed attempts to maintain the
system, Bretton Woods was terminated.
The failure of Bretton Woods set the stage for what would become the current era of
financial globalization and free capital markets. This movement led to the deconstruction
of most of the capital control policies among the advanced economies that signed the treaty
2 “ Article VI. Section 3. Controls of capital transfers: Members may exercise such controls as are
necessary to regulate international capital movements but no member may exercise these controls in a
manner which will restrict payments for current transactions or which will unduly delay transfers of funds in
settlement of commitments, except as provided in Article VII, Section 3(b) and in Article XIV, Section 2.”
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establishing the Bretton Woods system. Policymakers and economists alike revised their
support towards the campaign for free capital mobility.
The financial crises in Eastern Asia, Mexico, Russia, and other emerging market economies
through the 1990’s caused some policymakers to step back from financial liberalization. Most
economies continued liberalizing their capital accounts by removing capital controls. The
recent evolution in global capital control use is plotted in Figure 1.1 by income level for a
sample of 100 countries over the years 1996 - 2015. The index consists of the simple mean
number of restrictions per capital asset category, standardized to a scale between 0 and 1,
where 0 represents a completely free and open capital account and 1 represents a completely
closed capital account. There is a modest movement towards more closed capital accounts
in middle and high income countries following the Global Financial Crisis. The increase in
capital control use in low income countries following the Global Financial Crisis is striking,
considering the level of aggregation.
1.2 MACROECONOMIC MOTIVES
Magud et al. (2018) cite four macroeconomic motives for the use of capital controls in their
canonical literary assessment:
i. Alter capital flows composition towards longer maturities
ii. Reduce capital flows
iii. Generate monetary policy independence through interest rates differentials
iv. Reduce real exchange pressures
Similar motives, or variations on these, are found throughout the international finance liter-
ature (Forbes et al., 2015). Magud et al. (2018) study the published results of the effects of
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capital controls on these four outcomes in more than thirty papers, and take methodological
rigor into account. Methodological rigor is crucial as the decision to use capital controls is
endogeneous with respect to these outcome variables of interest. It is therefore difficult to
econometrically evaluate the effect that capital controls have on these outcome variables in
an unbiased way. Magud et al. (2018) find evidence that the use of capital controls has led to
more independent monetary policy, a larger share of longer-term capital flows, and in some
cases reduced real exchange pressure. While not exhaustive, the results are consistent with
papers not included in the Magud et al. (2018) survey (e.g. Carlson and Hernandez, 2002;
Klein, 2012).
Forbes et al. (2015) use weekly data to evaluate the use of capital controls in 60 countries
from 2009 to 2011. The authors solve the endogeneity problem by using propensity score
matching. The methodology exploits the fact that countries varying their capital control
policies share specific characteristics and are responding to changes in the observed vari-
ables that the capital controls are intended to influence. Forbes et al. (2015) analyze 15
macroeconomic and financial-stability objectives for different changes in controls, and find
that removing controls on capital outflows may reduce real exchange rate appreciation. The
authors suggest that the most popular measures are not “good for” accomplishing their
stated aims, as the evidence portrayed no effectiveness.
Chen and Nugent (2019) use annual data together with information from the Fernández
et al. (2015) data set to evaluate capital controls on a country by country basis. With
a similar methodological objective as Forbes et al. (2015), Chen and Nugent (2019) use
the synthetic control method to solve the endogeneity problem. This method efficiently
estimates the counterfactual: what would have happened in the treated country had the
capital control policy not changed? The authors find evidence that removing controls from
inflows and imposing controls on outflows increased real exchange rate appreciation by an
average of 9% in Egypt in 2008 and the three following years. Removing controls are also
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found to lead to higher outflows generally.
There exist several cases of well-known and well-studied capital control events. Chile
experienced a surge in capital inflows in 1990. In June of 1991, a 20 percent nonremunerated
resume requirement was imposed for all foreign-denominated direct borrowing by firms which
was to be deposited at the Central Bank for a period of one year (Magud et al., 2018). The
Chilean case is known for its above-average success. It is generally accepted that the capital
controls did not reduce the level of capital flows entering Chilean financial markets. However,
many authors who have studied this case have found that the capital controls were successful
in lengthening the maturity composition of the capital controls and in supporting the level
of monetary policy independence (Gregorio et al., 2000; Gallego et al., 1999; Laban and
Larrain, 1998; Budnevich and Le Fort, 1997). While unable to reduce the overall level of
capital flows, lengthening the maturity composition is an important task. Surges in short-
term debt can fuel asset price bubbles and come with higher rollover risk than longer-term
instruments.
The most well-studied case of a country that is considered to have successfully limited the
level of capital inflows in the face of surging inflows using capital controls is Malaysia (Spain
and Thailand are less-studied however important examples). In the face of inflows in the
early 1990’s, Malaysia implemented quantity restrictions on capital inflows (Magud et al.,
2018). Among these restrictions included a ceiling on banks’ non-trade- or non-investment-
related external liabilities, and a prohibition against Malaysian residents from selling short-
term debt instruments to non-residents. Ariyoshi et al. (2000) find significant evidence
that the Malaysian capital controls were successful across all four macroeconomic objectives:
lengthening the maturity composition, limiting the volume of capital flows, limiting real
exchange rate appreciation, and increasing the independence of monetary policy. This is one
of very few cases in which the overall level of capital flows was limited and is often attributed
to the unforgiving nature of quantity restrictions.
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Malaysia is also known as one of very few cases in which countries have demonstrated
success with controls on capital outflows (Magud et al., 2018). Controls on capital outflows
have been imposed in response to a financial crisis, as was the case in Malaysia in 1998. Other
notable cases include Cyprus and Iceland. Iceland imposes controls on capital outflows near
the end of 2008 in response to the ensuing financial crisis. Iceland received high levels
of capital inflows leading up to the financial crisis. The capital controls were imposed in
October, 2008 to prevent extensive capital flight and the collapse of the exchange rate that
would follow. There is a consensus in the literature that Iceland is extraordinary case
in its use of capital controls and their effectiveness (Baldursson and Portes, 2013). The
effectiveness of the controls in Iceland is can be ascertained by the stability of the exchange
rate following the imposition of the controls in 2009. Iceland’s real exchange rate with the
United States Dollar is plotted in Figure 1.2. Observe that the Icelandic króna depreciates
by more than 75% between 2007 and 2008. Further depreciation is contained after the capital
controls are imposed. Capital controls are a policy often used during times of crisis and we
discuss the role of this policy in the international finance literature in the following section.
1.3 FINANCIAL-STABILITY MOTIVES
A closely connected branch of the literature has motivated capital controls as a solution to
capital market distortions. Engel (2012) cites three such capital market distortions:
i. Bubbles or waves of optimism
ii. Information asymmetry
iii. Pecuniary externalities
Due to their nature, these issues are more commonly studied among the theoretical literature.
We begin with the structural models and later comment on the empirical evidence.
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The use of capital controls is a policy that often arises during crisis, particularly in the
event of a sudden stop. The term sudden stop characterizes a sharp reversal in external
capital inflows. In the event of a sudden stop, access to international financial markets
becomes prohibitively costly. Further, the local currency experiences sharp real depreciation,
asset prices decline, and the economy would suffer from a deep recession. Recent episodes
include the Tequila crisis in Mexico and Argentina in 1994-1995, and the East Asian crisis
in Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Philippines in
1997-1998. Emerging market economies have individually experienced sudden stops; recent
examples include Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Ukraine, Ecuador, Morocco, Venezuela, Russia,
and Turkey. The Keynes and Olin debate on post-WWI Germany is a well-known example.
Germany suffered from a devalued real exchange rate that stemmed from owing large external
debts to France and running a large current account surplus.
Emerging market economies typically borrow from international financial markets and
are subject to collateral constraints. Korinek (2011) explains that during good economic
times, emerging market economies accumulate large debts that tend to be dominated in
foreign currencies. In the event that economic conditions take a turn and the collateral
constraints become binding, an economy will be required to reduce their consumption and
sell their the assets in a fire-sale. Once this happens, the value of collateral would reduce
sharply and causing the collateral constraint to be even more restrictive. A downward spiral
in consumption, the real exchange rate, and asset prices triggers a vicious circle of falling
borrowing ability. The situation would be worse yet in the case that an emerging market
economy uses a fixed exchange rate or tries to exchange rate sterilization during the good
times. In this worse case, an emerging market economy that hits the collateral constraint
and sells off assets in a fire-sale will trigger capital flight. To keep the exchange rate at the
predetermined fixed level, the central bank will have to sell its foreign reserves in exchange for
the domestic currency. If and when the central bank exhausts its reserves, a large devaluation
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is anticipated.
The literature on sudden stops builds on the understanding of financial amplification
through asset prices in closed-economy settings. The classic articles by Fisher (1933) and
Minsky et al. (1986) are the workforce to these models. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) gives the
general framework to this strand of the literature. A typical and pertinent determinant of
financial instability is pecuniary externalities. A pecuniary externality describes a scenario
where private agents fail to internalize their effect on equilibrium prices, and in turn these
prices affect financial constraints (Kehoe and Levine, 1993; Lorenzoni, 2008; Bianchi, 2011).
Mendoza and Terrones (2012) states that banking crises, currency crises or sudden stops
often follow credit booms. The crisis follow after the leverage rises during expansions until it
triggers a financial constraint, causing Fisherian deflation that reduces credit and the price
and quantity of collateral assets. Bianchi and Mendoza (2018) builds a business cycle model
with collateral constraints featuring binding constraints that triggers Fisherian deflation
and overborrowing as a result of the agents’ failure to internalize the pecuniary externality
(Bianchi, 2011). Another externality could stem from a nominal rigidity. Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2016) incorporate downward nominal wage rigidity in a fixed exchange rate regime
that generates involuntary unemployment. The model features overborrowing during booms
and high unemployment during busts and the results mainly pertain to European countries.
When the economy is in the boom, agents do not internalize the nominal wage rigidity.
Although the economy enjoys full employment, the increase in nominal wages is a signal of
bad things to come. If the economy is hit by a negative shock, aggregate demand collapses.
Due to downward nominal wage rigidity and the currency peg, the aggregate supply can not
adjust. As a result, the economy suffers involuntary unemployment.
A principle motive of the research on sudden stops is to establish the link between finan-
cial instability and macroeconomic collapse. Economists have suggested capital controls as
a means of dealing with high capital flows volatility and sharp current account reversal, in
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terms of a supplementary tool to monetary policy in emerging market economies (Edwards,
2007; Ostry et al., 2011). Traditional monetary policy alone may not effectively stem the ex-
ternal shocks in emerging markets. Capital controls or macroprudential policy are suggested
as complements to monetary policy (Farhi and Werning, 2012, 2014; Rey, 2015).
Many have discussed that financial frictions dampen conventional monetary policy tools
(Céspedes et al., 2004; Devereux et al., 2006; Gertler et al., 2007). In the presence of
financial frictions, capital controls may constitute a second-best optimal policy response.
If a planner restricts borrowing using a capital control before a capital constraint becomes
binding, then when a negative shock occurs, the policy relaxes the constraint. This results
in first-order welfare benefits. There is a consensus in the literature that the existence of
a pecuniary externality justifies macroprudential policy intervention (Korinek, 2010). A
series of recent papers have noted the possibility that taxes on capital flows can correct
pecuniary externalities associated with occasionally binding borrowing constraints (Bianchi,
2011; Benigno et al., 2013; Bianchi and Mendoza, 2018; Jeanne and Korinek, 2010a).
The normative analysis of prudential policy focuses on two sets of policies: (a) macropru-
dential or ex ante policies that are implemented in good times to mitigate the frequency and
severity of sudden stops in the future (e.g. Bianchi and Mendoza, 2018; Jeanne and Korinek,
2010a; Bianchi, 2011) and (b) ex post policies aimed at dealing with financial amplification
once the Fisherian mechanism is in motion (e.g. Benigno and Woodford, 2012; Benigno and
Fornaro, 2012; Bianchi, 2016; Jeanne and Korinek, 2013). Recently, Davis and Devereux
(2019) compare the effectiveness of ex-ante/ex-post capital controls with international co-
operation and find that capital controls can be effective under international cooperation.
Further, the authors find that capital controls can significantly ease financial constraints
when applied ex-post for crisis management and reduce the likelihood of a crisis when used
ex-ante for prudential purposes.
Korinek and Sandri (2016) illustrate that capital controls segment domestic and inter-
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national financial market whereas macroprudential policies restrict borrowing by domestic
agents independently of whether credit is provided by domestic or foreign creditors. The key
difference between domestic and foreign borrowing materializes when borrowers are forced
to deleverage. Repayments to domestic creditors remain in the domestic economy where
they contribute to domestic aggregate demand, whereas repayments to international lenders
reduce domestic aggregate demand; they lead to capital outflows and depreciate the countrys
exchange rate. Bianchi and Mendoza (2018) find that the use macroprudential policies leads
to a significant reduction in financial fragility. The probability of crisis falls from 3% to
0.3%. However, the authors find that constant debt taxes are ineffective and can be welfare
reducing. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) examine the scope for macroprudential policy as
a tool for smoothing aggregate demand in the presence of nominal rigidities. In presence of
downward nominal wage rigidity and a currency peg, the authors find that an optimal capital
control is prudential and reduces unemployment by around 5 percentage points. Farhi and
Werning (2016) developed a new general theoretical foundation for macroprudential policies
with nominal rigidities in goods and labor markets, the zero lower bound, or fixed exchange
rates. The authors showed that government intervention in financial markets in the form of
macroprudential financial taxes or quantity restrictions generate Pareto improvements.
In a series of policy analyses in support of the IMF’s revised policy guidance, researchers
at the IMF have produced important empirical evidence on the effectiveness of capital con-
trols for improving financial stability and growth resilience (Qureshi et al., 2011; Ostry et al.,
2011; Habermeier et al., 2011; Ghosh et al., 2012). Ostry et al. (2011) write that capital con-
trols will be especially helpful where transactions occur outside the regulated financial system
and are therefore out of reach of prudential policy. A mix of capital controls and prudential
measures can jointly reduce vulnerabilities on domestic balance sheets, limit distortions, and
prevent circumvention.
Qureshi et al. (2011) study the effectiveness of capital controls and prudential policies
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using a sample of 51 emerging market economies exploiting cross-sectional variation with the
2008 Financial Crisis as a natural experiment. Capital controls and foreign exchange-related
prudential regulations significantly reduced the share of debt liabilities out total liabilities as
well as the proportion of foreign-denominated loans in domestic bank lending. Qureshi et al.
(2011) estimate that an interquartile shift in capital control or foreign-exchange regulatory
restrictiveness is associated with a 20-25 percentage point decrease in the share of bank
loans that are denominated in foreign currencies. This economically significant reduction in
foreign exchange exposure is an important finding in the improvement in financial stability
associated with the use of capital controls and prudential policies. The key finding of Qureshi
et al. (2011) is the result that countries that had capital controls in place prior to the 2008
Financial Crisis had higher relative real GDP growth rates. The result that capital controls
are useful for improving growth resilience or reducing the vulnerability to crises is consistent
with previous findings in the literature (Gupta et al., 2007; Pyun and An, 2016; Edwards
and Rigobon, 2009).
1.4 MULTILATERAL ASPECTS
The use of monetary, fiscal, and financial policies in any one country has the potential to
give rise to spillovers in other countries. The use of capital controls can deflect capital
flows to countries with similar characteristics (Giordani et al., 2017). Forbes et al. (2016)
and Lambert et al. (2011) find significant effects on capital flows to other countries from
the imposition of capital controls by Brazil. The volume of capital flows to countries with
similar characteristics increased. Countries that were perceived to have a risk of following
in Brazil’s footsteps received a lower volume of capital flows. The use of unconventional
monetary policy in advanced economies can also cause large amounts of capital to flow to
and from emerging markets economies, prompting the use of capital controls (Tillmann,
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2016; Curcuru et al., 2018; Gagnon et al., 2017; Singh and Wang, 2017).
These and other conflicts in the international financial policy space have heeded calls for
coordination. Ghosh et al. (2014) looked at regulating capital flows at the source and the
destination, and found this to be a useful channel for coordination. Others have looked at this
issue and find little to gain from coordinating (Giordani et al., 2017; Korinek, 2016; Jeanne,
2018). This perspective takes the capital market distortions as pecuniary externalities and
therefore Pareto efficient. There is a question of whether there is a welfare gain possible in
smoothing consumption when individual countries act as competitive agents and set policy
accordingly. The condition of this and other work is that policymakers not pursue capital
control policy with the sole intention of improving their terms of trade at the expense of the
market, constituting a classic beggar-thy-neighbor policy.
1.5 COST TO FIRMS
Capital controls work by increasing the cost of capital. There is a small but growing body
of evidence that the cost to firms is not arbitrary. Korinek (2011) reconciles this cost as the
capital control doing its job; borrowers internalizing the effect of their individual decisions
on equilibrium prices and therefore borrowing less. Alfaro et al. (2017a) study the effect of
the Brazilian capital controls on firm outcomes in Brazil. The authors find that there is a
significant decline in cumulative abnormal returns and real investment for Brazilian firms
following the imposition of the capital controls. Alfaro et al. (2017a) add that smaller firms,
non-exporting firms, and firms dependent on external finance are most adversely affected.
Forbes (2005b) studies the cost of the Chilean capital controls at the firm level and also finds
that smaller firms are the most adversely affected.
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1.6 CONCLUSION
The empirical evidence on capital controls has revealed that they are useful for pushing the
maturity composition of capital flows toward the long-term end, generating monetary inde-
pendence through interest rate differentials, reducing the share of bank loans denominated in
foreign currencies, improving economic resilience, and to a lesser extent, reducing exchange
rate pressures.
The theoretical literature has advocated using capital controls as second-best policy in
the presence of a pecuniary externality. Restricting capital inflows as prudential tool during
economic booms may distort the efficient allocation of capital but it invokes precautionary
saving behavior, so that agents do not overborrow. The financial crises triggered by capital
market distortions such as sudden stops can be mitigated by the use of prudential capital
controls, heightened in the boom and released during the bust.
The IMF has detailed its policy guidance in “The Liberalization and Management of
Capital Flows: An Institutional View,” in which the IMF endorsed selective use of capital
controls (Arora et al., 2013). Specifically, the IMF wrote that such measures may be useful
in certain circumstances, but that controls should not serve as a substitute for warranted
macroeconomic adjustment. Researchers at the IMF have long suggested that the first line
of defense against inflow surges should be macro policies. Likewise, the first line of defense
against financial-stability risks should be prudential policies. Once all first-line options have
been exhausted, the exchange rate should absorb additional pressures (Ostry et al., 2011).
The authors continue to suggest that only after all macroeconomic-cum-exchange-rate policy
options have been fully exhausted are capital controls a useful option. Capital controls will
be particularly useful where the risks identified bypass regulated financial institutions and
are therefore out of reach of typical prudential measures.
Future research on measuring the restrictiveness of capital controls and their effectiveness
CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 16
on the intensive margin would be a highly valued contribution to the literature. Much of
the research is based on de jure measures and effectiveness is based on the extensive margin.
This is a complicated task as the use of capital controls is highly differentiated. Researchers
might draw on the methods used for standardizing non-tariff measures across countries.
Another open question is the net benefits of capital controls accounting for the increased
cost of capital for firms. Most papers approach the welfare analysis of a capital control policy
using small open economy models with representative households and firms. We don’t have
complete understanding of the way that the increased cost of capital hinders investment and
aggregate productivity and how this balances against the improved firm performance as the
result of financial stability and economic resilience. This calls for the evaluation of capital
control policy using a model that explicitly models firm heterogeneity and firm dynamics.
Chapter 2
On the Effectiveness of Capital
Controls: A Synthetic Control
Method Approach
with Meng-Ting Chen
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2011 revised its policy stance on capital con-
trols, publishing the “The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows: An Institutional
View,” and recognized that in certain circumstances capital flow management measures can
be useful (Arora et al., 2013). The evidence to date suggests that capital controls push the
maturity composition of capital flows toward the long-term end, generate monetary inde-
pendence through interest rate differentials, reduce the share of bank lending denominated
in foreign currencies, reduce exchange rate pressures to a small extent, but fail to stem the
overall volume of capital flows (Montiel and Reinhart, 1999; Carlson and Hernandez, 2002;
Alfaro et al., 2005; Magud et al., 2018). There is a growing body of related evidence that
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shows that capital controls are useful for improving growth resilience and reducing the vul-
nerability to crises (Qureshi et al., 2011; Gupta et al., 2007; Edwards and Rigobon, 2009;
Pyun and An, 2016). Open economy models rationalize the empirical evidence, where the
role of an optimal capital control is to internalize a pecuniary externality. A pecuniary exter-
nality arises in situations where private agents fail to internalize their effect on equilibrium
prices such as the exchange rate or asset prices, and in turn these prices affect financial
constraints. The use of capital controls has been shown to limit excessive borrowing therein
limiting the fallout to a financial crisis (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2017; Benigno et al., 2013;
Bianchi and Mendoza, 2011; Jeanne and Korinek, 2010b).
Capital controls are measures that restrict capital mobility between residents and non-
residents, segmenting domestic and international financial markets. Capital controls typi-
cally work by increasing the cost of an international financial transaction, but can also take
place in quantity restrictions or outright bans. Increasing the restrictions on capital inflows
and decreasing the restrictions on capital outflows are measures used to stem surges in net
inflows, large credit growth, and rapid exchange rate appreciation (Forbes et al., 2015). Simi-
larly, decreasing restrictions on capital inflows and increasing restrictions on capital outflows
are measures used to reverse sudden stops, credit retrenchment, and significant exchange
rate depreciation. Controls on capital inflows are also useful for improving financial stability
by limiting over-borrowing, excessive risk-taking, and excessive short-term debt (Benigno
et al., 2016; Bianchi and Mendoza, 2011; Korinek, 2011).
We study the role of capital controls in the short-run dynamics of countries’ external
position: cross-border lending, private credit, movements in the exchange rate, and cross-
border deposits. Cross-border lending and private credit are measures of financial stability,
while movements in the exchange rate and cross-border deposits are measures of capital
flows management. Higher cross-border lending incurs higher exposure to foreign exchange
risk, and is a recent motive for capital controls (Ostry et al., 2011). Private credit is tied
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to the vulnerability of an economy to external shock in the case of overborrowing (Schular-
ick and Taylor, 2012; Bianchi, 2011). The exchange rate is strongly connected to the net
movements in external capital. In the pecuniary externalities perspective, capital controls
and exchange rate policy can serve as complements, causing investors to internalize the cost
of debt (Bianchi, 2011; Benigno et al., 2016). Finally, cross-border deposits reflect capi-
tal outflows, an explicit motive for capital controls particularly in the case of capital flight
(Baldursson and Portes, 2013).
We look at four capital control measures: removing or imposing controls on capital
inflows and removing or imposing controls on capital outflows. We study the effect that
these measures have on cross-border lending, private credit, movements in the exchange
rate, and cross-border deposits. We identify such measures in Russia, Egypt, Kenya, and
Nigeria according to a set of criteria informed by the synthetic control method. The sample
of countries is based on a new dataset of capital control measures by Fernández et al. (2015),
with de jure information on 100 countries over the years 1995–2015. This set of statutory
measures to our knowledge has not been previously evaluated. The evidence that we present
adds to the understanding on the effectiveness of capital controls. Due to the extent of the
mixed evidence and the difficulties facing the econometric techniques that have been used
to assess the effectiveness of capital controls, many questions remain unsettled.
Econometric models face many challenges in assessing the effectiveness of capital controls,
chief among them is the the endogeneity of the decision to implement the policy. The
endogeneous nature of the policy analysis stems from reverse causality. Take for example
the effect that capital controls have on capital inflows. The quantitative assessment of this
outcome is complicated by the fact that policymakers respond to large capital inflows by
imposing capital controls, hence the reverse causality. Well-studied examples include Chile
following large inflows in 1990, Colombia following large inflows in 1991, and Brazil following
large inflows in 2006 (Magud et al., 2018). This classic case of reverse causality, where an
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explanatory variable depends on the value of the dependent variable creates an endogeneity
problem for traditional linear regression. Serial correlation in the residual term prevents
lagging the endogeneous explanatory variable from solving the endogeneity problem.
Using the synthetic control method, we are able to solve the endogeneity problem in
the evaluation of capital controls with respect to the policy objectives in a novel way. The
synthetic control method solves the endogeneity problem by constructing a counterfactual
outcome that represents what a country would have experienced had the capital control
event not occurred (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). For example,
to assess the effect that imposing capital controls in Egypt had on the exchange rate, we
construct a counterfactual to Egypt’s exchange rate that consists of several countries that
never change capital controls and that jointly approximate the evolution of Egypt’s exchange
rate before the change.
Similar analysis is performed using the difference-in-difference method. Abadie et al.
(2010) motivated the synthetic control approach as providing a better comparison because a
data-driven linear combination of countries serves as a better counterfactual than one country
or a group of countries, all with equal weights. We compare the results of the evaluation of
the capital control events using the synthetic control method with results obtained using the
difference-in-difference method. These two methods are similar in their estimation strategy
but differ in the identification of the control group and their identifying assumptions. The
synthetic control method assumes independence of treatment conditional on past outcomes.
Difference-in-difference assumes that treated and control groups follow parallel trends over
time. We show in sensitivity analysis that independence conditional on past outcomes holds,
but parallel trends fails.
The evidence that we find suggests that capital controls are not consistent in reaching
conventional financial stability objectives. For example, following the imposition of controls
in Egypt and Nigeria, lower cross-border lending is expected to both countries. However, we
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observe lower cross-border lending to Egypt, but higher cross-border lending to Nigeria. We
find that capital controls are more consistent in reaching conventional cash flows management
objectives. For example, we find lower cross-border deposits from Egypt after the imposition
of controls on outflows, and higher cross-border deposits from Russia after the removal of
the same controls. We compare the results of the synthetic control models to a set of similar
models evaluated using the difference-in-difference method. We are able to corroborate the
significance and magnitude of several outcomes. Finally, we confirm the credibility of the
results in a series of placebo simulations and test the identifying assumptions of each method.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents a brief literature review. Next,
we discuss the case studies and some facts about the data. The following section presents
a discussion on the empirical model. Immediately following the presentation on the method
is a discussion of the results of the synthetic control method. After results, we present the
sensitivity analysis. The final section concludes.
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW
The evidence on capital controls’ effectiveness for improving financial stability remains
mixed. The relationship between external capital flows and financial instability in emerging
market economies has been extensively documented (Kose et al., 2009; Reinhart and Rein-
hart, 2009; Ocampo and Stiglitz, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). The financial stability
motive is the focus of the influential contributions of Jeanne and Korinek (2010b), Bianchi
and Mendoza (2011), and Mendoza (2002). In a related study, Acharya and Krishnamurthy
(2018) argue that foreign reserve management and prudential capital controls work as com-
plements in addressing financial stability1. However, Forbes et al. (2015) find little empirical
evidence to suggest that capital controls are useful for financial stability. While much of
1Also of note: Aizenman et al. (2011) and Jeanne and Sandri (2016)
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literature has focused topics such as overborrowing, pecuniary externalities2 and the welfare
effects of capital controls3, our research focuses on short-run dynamics of countries’ external
position.
A small number of studies have evaluated capital controls using methods that control for
potential omitted variables and reverse causality. In evaluating the effect of capital controls
on capital flows, many have argued that a statistically significant and negative coefficient in
the presence of reverse causality is a robust result (Ostry et al., 2012; Bruno et al., 2017; Landi
and Schiavone, 2018). However, Magud et al. (2018) and Nugent (2018) demonstrate that
the negative coefficient need not be the case for all countries. In other words, it is possible
that a capital control leads to higher net inflows. Researchers have relied on a handful
of ways to address reverse causality including the propensity score method (Forbes et al.,
2015), instrumental variables (Giordani et al., 2017; Kinda, 2012; Nugent, 2018), and vector
autoregression (Gregorio et al., 2000; Edison and Reinhart, 2001). However, these methods
are still potentially subject to omitted variables and mis-specification bias. To solve these
issues, we use a new data-driven method to examine the effectiveness of capital controls.
The synthetic control method allows us to address the endogeneity of capital controls with
respect to the policy objectives in a novel way.
The last group of papers related to our research includes the studies that apply the
synthetic control method. Since Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010)
introduced the synthetic control method, it has become a very important tool for policy
analysis. Athey and Imbens (2017) cite the synthetic control method as “arguably the most
important innovation in the policy evaluation literature in the last 15 years.” Recently, many
researchers have used the synthetic control method to analyze a variety of economic shocks
2Jeanne and Korinek (2010b); Korinek (2011); Bianchi and Mendoza (2011); ?; Benigno et al. (2013);
Korinek (2009)
3Korinek (2009); Jeanne and Korinek (2010b); Costinot et al. (2014), and Benigno et al. (2013)
CHAPTER 2. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPITAL CONTROLS 23
or to evaluate a change in policy4. Born et al. (2017) use the synthetic control method to
evaluate the output loss attributable to the Brexit vote. Chamon et al. (2017) use the same
method to analyze the Brazilian sterilized foreign exchange intervention in the aftermath
of the taper tantrum. They find that the Brazilian programs were successful in reversing
the exchange rate appreciation. Jinjarak et al. (2013) use the synthetic control method in
a closely related study to model the Brazilian capital control episodes and find that the
effectiveness of controls on capital inflows or the exchange rate is weak. The episodes that
Jinjarak et al. (2013) address are changes in capital controls on the intensive margin. We
use the same method to analyze the macroeconomic implications of broad changes in capital
controls on the extensive margin. Our results present a more general evaluation of capital
control effectiveness.
2.2 DATA
Table 2.1 contains the summary statistics for the outcome variables and the pre-intervention
characteristics in our sample. The sample contains information on 100 countries over the
years 1995–2015. A complete list of the countries is available in the Appendix. The outcome
variables that we study are cross-border lending, private credit, movements in the exchange
rate, and cross-border deposits. Cross-border lending and private credit are objectives of
capital controls that are associated with financial stability, movements in the exchange rate
and capital outflows are associated with traditional measures of capital flows management
(Forbes et al., 2015; Ostry et al., 2011; Korinek, 2011). We use cross-border lending as
a measure of risk-taking which involves borrowing in foreign currencies. We use private
credit presented as a percentage of output as our measure of borrowing. We use the log of
the real exchange rate as measured by the real local currency-USD exchange rate to assess
4Cavallo et al. (2013), Jinjarak et al. (2013), Kleven et al. (2013), Abadie et al. (2015), Pinotti (2015),
Gobillon and Magnac (2016)
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movements in the exchange rate, where lower (higher) values of the real exchange rate imply
higher appreciation (depreciation). Finally, we assess capital outflows using cross-border
deposits from a particular country to BIS reporting banks. We take the log of all aggregate
level variables and the exchange rate. The remaining variables are presented as a percentage
of GDP, exports, or trade volume for cross-country comparability. The summary statistics
are provided in Table 2.1 for all continuous variables used in the study for the full sample.
A list of all the variables, their definitions, and their sources is available in the Appendix.
The ranges (given by the distance between the minimum and the maximum) in the variables
demonstrate significant cross-sectional variation. For example, private credit ranges from
about 1.5% to 300% of GDP; the median is about 43% of GDP.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Log Cross Border Lending 23.072 23.136 2.5102 15.761 29.195
Private Credit 60.289 43.039 49.509 1.3854 312.12
Log Real Exchange Rate 2.3971 1.8286 2.4497 -1.3093 10.146
Log Cross Border Deposits 23.305 23.325 2.1932 17.265 29.175
Interest Rate 7.8719 5.4871 11.191 -.78375 300
Bank Return on Equity 12.646 13.227 17.787 -234.84 126.14
Log GDP (USD) 25.186 25.224 1.8797 20.881 30.529
Inflation 11.472 4.6077 126.02 -26.299 5399.5
Natural Resources (% of GDP) 6.9786 2.2881 10.390 0 61.957
Merchandise Trade (% of GDP) 67.369 56.985 45.649 12.293 419.96
Current Account (% of Exports) .03688 -.04470 2.1065 -26.169 49.510
Observations 2100
The pre-intervention characteristics that are used to match the outcome variables in the
treated countries with outcomes in potential donors are informed by the empirical litera-
ture on cross-border lending, credit, exchange rates, and capital flows (Bruno and Shin,
2015; Djankov et al., 2007; Jeanneau and Micu, 2002; Papaioannou, 2009; Kollmann et al.,
2011; Cerutti et al., 2015). The push/pull literature is the primary source for compiling a
country-specific list of the determinants of capital control outcomes. We use step-wise re-
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gression to select which variables to include in the synthetic control model, and refine the list
based on the predictor balance between the synthetic and control characteristics. The pre-
intervention characteristics are sourced from World Bank’s World Development Indicators,
the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, and the Global Financial Development Database. Additionally, we add
to the interest rate series with data from individual central banks where the original series is
missing observations. It is worth noting that the push/pull literature often points to global
factors as the principal determinants of capital flows and their related financial attributes.
However, the synthetic control method requires country-specific information. Global pre-
intervention characteristics would match perfectly across countries, preventing the synthetic
control algorithm from solving.
2.3 EMPIRICAL MODEL
The empirical model closely follows the synthetic control method presented in Abadie et al.
(2010). Yit is the outcome variable that is evaluated for the treated country i at time t
conditional on the capital control event. The treated countries (i “ 0) are Russia, Egypt,
Kenya, and Nigeria, and we have that i P t1, . . . , Nu for the countries in the donor pool
for each treated country. The time period begins in 1995, and treatment occurs in 2007
in Russia, 2008 in Egypt, 2007 in Kenya, and 2006 in Nigeria. Hence, time is indexed as
t “ t1995, . . . , T0, . . . , T0`4u, where T0 represents the number of pre-treatment periods, and
T0 ` 1 is the year of treatment for country i “ 0. We confine our analysis to the three years
after the capital control intervention. The outcome variables are log cross-border lending,
private credit, log real exchange rate, and log cross-border deposits. We assess the affect of
imposing or removing capital controls on these outcome variables.
Define Ŷit as the value of the outcome variable in the treated country had the capital
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control event not occurred, and Y Iit as the outcome that would be observed in country i at
time t if the capital control event has occurred. Ŷit is by definition the counterfactual to
Y Iit and is not observed. We assume no interference between units. No interference means
that the outcomes of the untreated units are not affected by the intervention implemented
in the treated unit (Rosenbaum (2007)). In the case of capital controls, we assume that
countries’ use of capital controls do not affect other countries external position5. We also
assume that the potential outcomes are independent of being selected for capital control
intervention, conditional on past outcomes and observed covariates. We discuss the strength
of these assumptions in sensitivity analysis.
Define αit “ Y
I
it ´ Ŷit as the effect of the capital control event in country i at time t and
Dit as the binary indicator equal to one for the treated countries at and after the treatment
date. Then according to the potential outcomes framework, the observed outcome for unit
i at time t can be expressed as Yit “ Ŷit ` αitDit. We estimate the series of capital control
effects
`
αi,T0`1 , . . . , αiT
˘
for t ą T0 for the treated country i “ 0 vis-à-vis an estimate of Ŷit,
where αit “ Y
I
it ´ Ŷit “ Yit ´ Ŷit.
Suppose that Ŷit can be estimated using a factor model specified according to the push/pull
literature and determinants described above. Then, we can write:
Ŷit “ δt ` θtZi ` λtµi ` εit, (2.1)
where Zi is a matrix of observed covariates and µi is a vector of unobserved factor load-
ings. Let W be an pN ˆ 1q vector of positive weights that sum to one: W “ pw1, . . . , wNq;
with wi ě 0 @ i “ 1, . . . , N . Each vector W represents a synthetic control—a weighted
combination of control group observations that estimate what would have happened in the
treated country had the capital control intervention not occurred. Suppose that there ex-
5There exists some evidence of capital flows deflection or multilateral policy influence (Giordani et al.,
2017; Forbes et al., 2016). The potential exists among countries of similar risk profiles.
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ists a set of optimal weights pw˚1 , . . . , w
˚
Nq that estimates the values of the pre-treatment





i Yit and that this condition holds for all periods given that there are sufficiently
many pre-treatment periods. From this result, we can estimate the capital control effects
using observed data and the optimal weights





for treated country i “ 0 and years t P tT0 ` 1, . . . , T0 ` 4u.
The capital control outcomes are observed for up to 21 periods—from 1995 to 2015—in
both the country undertaking the change in capital controls (Y0t) and in the countries where
no change in capital controls is taking place (Yit, i “ 1, . . . , N). We define the pT0ˆ1q vector
K “ pk1, . . . , kT0q
1 as a linear combination of pre-treatment outcomes: Ȳ Ki “
řT0
s“1 ksYis.
Assume that M such linear combinations are defined by the vectors K1, . . . ,KM . Further,








the country that undertakes the change in capital controls, where k “ r `M . The k ˆ N
matrix X1 contains the same information for the countries that do not undertake changes








the vector W ˚ is chosen to minimize the distance ‖X0 ´ X1W‖ such that the weights are
positive and sum to one. The distance is minimized using Equation
‖X0 ´X1W‖V “
a
pX0 ´X1W q1V pX0 ´X1W q, (2.3)
where V is a pk ˆ kq symmetric and positive semidefinite matrix. Optimal choice of V is
important for minimizing the mean square prediction error of the synthetic control estima-
tor. We use the Synth package available for Stata to choose V such that the mean square
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prediction error is minimized.
We use the optimal weights to construct a counterfactual country that gives an estimate
of the outcome variables had the capital control intervention not occurred using data based
on the donor pool countries i P t1, . . . , Nu. To assess the sensitivity of the results, we
follow Firpo and Possebom (2018) and Abadie et al. (2010) in the calculation of p-values
and Doudchenko and Imbens (2016) in the calculation of variance to estimate confidence
intervals. The p-value is calculated as:
p “
řN
i“1 I tRMSPEi ě RMSPE0u
N
, (2.4)
where I tQu is the indicator function of event Q and RMSPE represents the ratio of post-

















Intuitively, this statistic counts the number of countries in the donor pool that have outcomes
that can be better approximated using fellow donor pool countries and that have a larger
post-intervention gap between the counterfactual and the observed series. This version of
the p-value helps describe whether our results could be driven by chance or truly represent
















Each of these measures are calculated in placebo simulations where each of the countries in
the donor pool assume the role of the treated country, and a counterfactual series is estimated
to match the observed series. In the case of Equation 2.6, Yit is observed for the donor pool
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during the intervention years, so this statistic can be empirically estimated, using the donor
pool only.
Careful construction of the donor pool is necessary for satisfying the identifying assump-
tions of the synthetic control estimator. Previous studies on the effects of capital controls
using the synthetic control method have commonly included countries as donors despite ei-
ther pre-existing broad capital control use or changes in capital controls during the time
period of the study 6. The control group is meant to reproduce the counterfactual of how
the country using capital controls would have evolved had it not implemented capital control
policy. To that end, the control group, at the very least, should consist of countries that do
not implement capital control policy, and at best do not have capital controls implemented
over the entire sample period. In other words, countries exposed to treatment should not
be included in the donor pool. Our careful construction of the donor pool is an additional
contribution in the study of capital controls using the synthetic control method.
We use strict criteria to select the countries to be included in each donor pool. The
countries included in each donor pool have been listed in Tables 2.22–2.25. We are focused on
all capital controls except those on long-term investments (direct investment and real estate).
For the event that capital controls on inflows (outflows) are released, countries included in
the donor group have capital controls on inflows (outflows) imposed across nearly all capital
asset categories and for transactions initiated both by the resident and the non-resident. We
allow no more than two resident or non-resident transactions to be free of a capital control
6In Jinjarak et al. (2013), Indonesia is included in the donor pool with an optimal weight of .126 in
estimating the effect of taxing stock and bond foreign investment in Brazil at 2% in 2009. However, Indonesia
was also adjusting foreign access to stock and bond investment at the same time (Fernández et al. (2015)).
This includes allowing foreign investors access to the primary market for government bonds through a primary
dealer (International Monetary Fund Monetary and Capital Markets Department (2010)). Previously, foreign
investors could only obtain government bonds on secondary markets (International Monetary Fund Monetary
and Capital Markets Department (2008)). In Shousha and Sundaresan (2015), Uruguay is included in
the donor pool to model multiple outcomes the series of capital controls in Brazil from 2009–2013 and is
consistently assigned a positive weight. However, Uruguay implements a capital control on money market
inflows in 2012.
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in any capital asset category in any given year. For the event that capital controls on inflows
(outflows) are imposed, countries included in the donor group have no capital controls on
inflows (outflows) imposed for the duration of the sample period, with no more than one
capital control imposed on a transaction initiated by either a resident or non-resident, in any
capital control asset category.
Finally, we search for a sample of “treated” countries based on five criteria. First, we
look for cases of controls imposed on capital inflows, imposed on capital outflows, removed
from capital inflows, and removed from capital outflows. Second, we are interested in broad
changes in capital controls that are consistent with significant capital account liberalization
or capital account tightening. Third, we require a “pre-treatment” period where no changes
in the capital controls are made for at least 10 years. Fourth, we require that no other
changes in capital controls occur within three years of the intervention date. Availability of
data and applicable donor countries are important limits on the potential case studies. We
use the Fernández et al. (2015) to identify the patterns in capital controls among countries
across capital asset categories, over time. We perform background research and refer to
the IMF’s 2006, 2008, and 2010 Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions to build on the narrative around the capital control events.
We identify controls on capital outflows being removed in Russia in January 2007. We
identify controls on capital outflows being imposed in Egypt in 2008. We identify controls on
capital inflows being removed in Kenya in June 2007 and imposed in Nigeria in November
2006. There are cases of capital controls that are well-documented and have been featured
in the international economics literature; e.g. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Malaysia. Our
paper does not include these cases because they do not satisfy the strict criteria described
above.7
7For studies on Brazil, see: Alfaro et al. (2017b); Forbes et al. (2016); Jinjarak et al. (2013). For studies
on Chile, see: Forbes (2007); Edwards (2007); Edwards (1999). For studies on Colombia, see: Ariyoshi et al.
(2000); Budnevich and Le Fort (1997). For studies on Malaysia, see: Tamirisa (2004); Edison and Reinhart
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2.4 RESULTS
We proceed with the empirical macroeconomic analysis of the imposition and/or removal
of capital controls on an individual country basis. We evaluate the effect that the capital
control intervention had on cross-border lending, private credit, the exchange rate, and cross-
border deposits. We begin the analysis with the controls on capital outflows: the removal
of controls on capital outflows in Russia in 2007, then the imposition of controls on capital
outflows in Egypt in 2008. This is followed by analysis of the controls on capital inflows:
the imposition controls of capital inflows in Nigeria in 2006, then the removal of controls on
capital inflows in Kenya in 2007.
Table 2.2: Results Summary
OUTFLOWS CONTROLS INFLOWS CONTROLS
Country Russia Egypt Kenya Nigeria
Intervention Remove Impose Remove Impose
Cross-border Loans
Expectation Ò Ó Ò Ó
Result Ò Ó Ò
Private Credit
Expectation Ó Ò Ò Ó
Result Ò Ó Ò
Exchange Rate
Expectation Ò Ó Ó Ò
Result
Cross-border Deposits
Expectation Ò Ó Ò Ó
Result Ò Ó Ò
Ò Higher; Ò Dominantly Higher; Ó Lower; Ó Dominantly Lower
We have organized the results of our analysis together with the expected outcomes of
the capital control measures in Table 2.2. We illustrate whether we expect and observe
(2001). For an extensive review, see Magud et al. (2018).
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higher (lower) outcomes using upward (downward) arrows. The double arrows represent the
dominant response in terms of capital inflows or capital outflows. The dominant response is
important because this determines the change in net capital flows which in turn affects the
change in overall credit and the exchange rate. For example, we expect larger net inflows
to follow from the imposition of a control on outflows in Egypt. It follows that we expect
higher private credit and a lower exchange rate for Egypt.
2.4.1 Controls on Outflows Removed in Russia
Effective January 1, 2007, controls on capital outflows in Russia were removed. Through the
end of 2006, residents of Russia were required to satisfy unremunerated reserve requirements
on certain transactions (e.g. less than 3 years maturity or more than $150,000) using a
system of special accounts. The real GDP growth rate for Russia over the years 1995–2015
is plotted in Figure 2.1(a). Ahead of the release of the capital controls, the economy advanced
at a rapid pace with the real GDP growth rate increasing through 2007. Russia experienced
a sharp recession in 2009 as with much of the global economy. The interest rate was above
50% at the beginning of the sample period and stabilized near 5% by 2000, as plotted in
Figure 2.1(b). Russia’s economy has been dependent on commodities, with natural resource
rents above 10% of GDP for nearly the entire sample period. As a result, commodity prices
will be a driving factor for the duration of the test period.
Cross-border lending grew at a constant rate ahead of the release of the capital controls
in Russia. The synthetic control accurately models cross-border lending to Russia ahead of
the intervention. We plot the two series in Figure 2.2(a). The gap between the synthetic
control and the observed series following the removal of the capital control illustrates the
effect of the change in policy on cross-border lending. We find that cross-border lending was
19.38% higher over the three years following the removal of the capital controls in Russia
relative to the counterfactual. The large economic significance indicates that cross-border
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Figure 2.1: Economic Conditions in Russia 1995-2015
lending is highly responsive to capital controls. This result is statistically significant at the
10% level with a p-value of .08, with the caveat that this is not a traditionally generated
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Figure 2.2: Financial Stability for Russia & the Synthetic Control 1995-2010
p-value. The 95% confidence interval gives us further evidence that cross-border lending to
Russia would have been lower had the capital control not been removed.
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Figure 2.3: Cash Flows Management for Russia & the Synthetic Control 1995-2010
Removing controls on outflows incentivizes both higher inflows and higher outflows. How-
ever, we expect that the response would be dominant in outflows given that outflow trans-
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actions are now more lucrative relative to inflow transactions. Taken together, removing
controls on outflows implies lower net inflows from which we expect lower private credit.
Private credit in Russia was trending upwards ahead of the removal of the capital controls.
We see in 2.2(b) that had Russia not released the capital controls, private credit would have
been significantly less. Over the three years following the removal of the capital controls,
private credit in Russia was 6.325 percentage points higher than the counterfactual. This
result is not statistically significant with a p-value of .1667. However, we do see a statisti-
cally significant difference by the third year of intervention, and a close a predictor balance
in Table 2.7.
The absence of a contraction in credit following the removal of controls on capital outflows
in Russia is an important result that can give policymakers confidence about relaxing controls
on capital outflows in other countries. This outcome in credit is a clear result of the outcomes
that we observe in cross-border lending and cross-border deposits. While cross-border lending
increases following the removal of the controls, we’ll see that cross-border deposits did not
change much. Hence, there is more credit available to the private sector.
Following the removal of the controls on capital outflows, there may be a concern for
large capital outflows. Figure 2.3(a) plots the observed and synthetic cross-border deposits
from Russia. The synthetic control closely tracks cross-border deposits from Russia. The
predictor balance in Table 2.9 confirms the close fit of the synthetic control to cross-border
deposits from Russia. This particular model poses a challenge for the analysis when in 2005
the synthetic control deviated from the observed series, two years before the change in capital
control policy. There was a 36% deviation between cross-border deposits from Russia and
the counterfactual each year through 2007. The consistent nature of the deviation can be
observed visually in Figure 2.3(a) and is observed in the data8. Because of the singular,
8Russian cross-border deposits were 36.28% higher than the counterfactual in 2005, 36.78% higher in
2006, 35.19% higher in 2007.
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consistent nature of this deviation, the subsequent .93% increase in the distance between
cross-border deposits from Russia and the counterfactual over 2007–2009 can be reasonably
attributed to the removal of the capital controls in 2007. Our main takeaway is that this is
a very small change and reflects that Russia did not experience capital flight following the
removal of the controls on capital outflows.
There may also be a concern for a devaluation in the real exchange rate. As demonstrated
in Figure 2.3(b), the synthetic control does not match the Russian log real exchange rate
well. The wide confidence interval indicates that there is large variation in the donor pool.
While we cannot identify the movements in the exchange rate that result from removing the
capital controls, we can make a qualitative assessment based on the trend in the log real
exchange rate. In Figure 2.3(b), we see a downward trend representing appreciation in the
real exchange rate. The years following the removal of the capital controls sustain a relatively
level log real exchange rate. This indicates that Russia does not experience significant real
exchange rate depreciation.
2.4.2 Controls on Outflows Imposed and Controls on Inflows Re-
moved in Egypt
For much of the sample period, Egypt experienced a shortage of foreign exchange in the
banking system (Economist Intelligence Unit (2014)). As a means of closing the shortage,
Egypt imposed controls on capital outflows. In 2008, Egypt implemented restrictions on
investment in foreign securities or assets abroad, and these restrictions are applied across
multiple asset categories9.
The real GDP growth rate and interest rate are plotted in Figure 2.4. The interest rate
9On June 1, 2008, Egypt began also allowing international institutions to issue bonds in their local
market following Law No. 123 of Year 2008, but the issues were subject to the approval of the Capital
Market Authority
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Figure 2.4: Economic Conditions in Egypt 1995-2015
was steadily decreasing over the first half of the sample period, and trended slightly upward
ahead of the capital control intervention. Additionally, Egypt experienced a deceleration
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Figure 2.5: Financial Stability for Egypt & the Synthetic Control 1995-2011
during the 2008 global financial crisis, but the economy did not experience a recession.
Further, Egyptian manufacturing value-added is second largest on the African continent, so
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Figure 2.6: Cash Flows Management for Egypt & the Synthetic Control 1995-2011
merchandise trade will be an important characteristic for modeling the synthetic controls
(Signé (2018)).
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Over the three years following the change in capital controls in 2008, cross-border lending
to Egypt decreased by 29.04 %. The predictor balance used to identify the synthetic control
together with the country weights and root mean square predictor error are presented in
Table 2.10. The small distance between the predictors is indicative of the close fit between
cross-border lending to Egypt and the synthetic control observed in Figure 2.5(a). While the
p-value for this outcome is .2424, the 95% confidence interval demonstrates a statistically
significant difference between the counterfactual and observed series. We expect lower inflows
with the imposition of controls on capital outflows, consistent with the evidence that we have
documented here.
The synthetic control and private credit series are well-balanced until 2007 when they
begin to diverge one year before the intervention (the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant). The mixed balance across the predictors in Table 2.5(b) is consistent with the partial
fit observed in Figure 2.5(b). Within the margin of error, we can make a qualitative obser-
vation that had the capital controls not changed in Egypt, private credit would have been
higher. This is consistent with what we would expect from higher net inflows resulting from
the imposition of controls on capital outflows.
In the year of the intervention and the three years following, cross-border deposits were
30.51% lower than what they would have been had Egypt not changed its capital controls.
We plot cross-border deposits and the synthetic control in Figure 2.6(a). While the p-value
is .1515, the 95% confidence interval demonstrates a significant difference between the two
series during the intervention years. We expected that the control on outflows would decrease
cross-border deposits by more than loans, and that outcome is what we observe.
The observed log exchange rate in Egypt and the synthetic control are plotted in Figure
2.6(b). The real exchange rate is decreased (appreciated) over the pre-treatment period.
Over the three years following the imposition of the controls on outflows, we find that the
Egyptian currency was worth 8.71% more in real terms than what the currency would have
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been worth during this time had Egypt not changed the capital controls. The 95% confidence
interval indicates that the synthetic and observed series are significantly different during the
intervention years. Recall that Egypt implemented the capital controls facing a shortage
of foreign exchange which puts downward pressure on the value of the Egyptian Pound.
Imposing controls on outflows, Egypt was able to prevent a modest amount of currency
depreciation.
2.4.3 Controls on Inflows Released in Kenya
Kenya began steps towards global integration in the early 90’s with the removal of foreign
exchange and price controls. Over the sample period, Kenya saw an upward trend in growth
rates and a downward trend in the interest rate, with moderate year-to-year volatility in the
growth rate. In June 2007, the Kenyan Capital Markets Authority fully opened its fixed
income securities and derivatives markets to investors from countries in the Eastern Africa
Community10 (Capital Markets Authority (2007)). This is the only change in capital controls
we observe taking place in Kenya between 1995 and 2015.
Cross-border lending to Kenya trended slightly upwards over the pre-treatment period,
as plotted in Figure 2.8(a). Synthetic cross-border lending for Kenya is an imperfect fit, and
the predictor balance in Table 2.14 is mixed. The lumpy characteristics of the cross-border
lending to Kenya makes for a difficult match, and the variance of the synthetic series is very
large. In practice, we would not expect cross-border lending to Kenya to be changed as a
result of the intervention. The countries in the Eastern Africa Community to which Kenya
opened its financial account are not BIS reporting countries. Hence, we do not capture
cross-border lending from those countries that have the increased financial market access.
We show in Figure 2.8(b) that the synthetic control does not approximate private credit
10The Eastern Africa Community is currently made up of six Partner States: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda,
South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Kenya initiated the Eastern Africa Community in 2000.
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Figure 2.7: Economic Conditions in Kenya 1995-2015
in Kenya either. As with cross-border lending, this could be due to the relatively lumpy
nature of private credit in Kenya. The predictor balance in Table 2.15 shows mixed distances
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Figure 2.8: Financial Stability for Kenya & the Synthetic Control 1995-2010
between Kenya and the synthetic control. While private credit grew strongly after the release
of the capital controls, we cannot identify causality without a proper counterfactual.
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Figure 2.9: Cash Flows Management for Kenya & the Synthetic Control 1995-2010
Capital outflows as measured by cross-border deposits from Kenya are well-modeled by
the synthetic control. We plot both series in Figure 2.9(a). Cross-border deposits were grow-
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ing at a modest pace for the duration of the pre-treatment period. Following the removal of
the capital controls on inflows in 2008, cross-border deposits from Kenya continued growing
at a modest pace and level off. The counterfactual demonstrates that had Kenya not relaxed
the capital controls, cross-border deposits from Kenya would have been lower during this
period. We find that cross-border deposits from Kenya were 20.57% higher than the coun-
terfactual over the first three years with the capital controls relaxed. While the p-value for
this result is .1667, we see that the two series are statistically significantly different in later
years of intervention. We derive the intuition for this result by again recalling that today’s
inflows are tomorrow’s outflows; should more capital enter the country with the incentive of
lower transaction costs today, more capital exits the country tomorrow.
The log exchange rate is not accurately modeled using the synthetic control method
for Kenya. Figure 2.9(b) plots the exchange rate for Kenya and synthetic Kenya. While
movements in the exchange rate are well-captured early in the pre-treatment period, the two
series diverged in 2006 ahead of the intervention. The inaccurate fit is consistent with the
unbalanced predictors in Table 2.16.
2.4.4 Controls on Inflows Implemented in Nigeria
Nigeria has experienced remarkable growth over the last two decades and is now the third
largest manufacturer by value-added on the African continent (Signé (2018)). Nigeria is a
member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries with large oil reserves, but
its growth in manufacturing has overtaken the importance of oil in the economy. The GDP
growth rate over the sample period is plotted in Figure 2.10(a). In 1996, Nigerian total
natural resources rents were 37.5% of GDP when the average annual OPEC crude oil price
was $20.29 per barrel, and in 2015 total natural resources rents were just 4.7% with the
average annual OPEC crude oil price at $49.49 per barrel. Thus, at the beginning of the
sample period, commodity prices were a driving factor, while merchandise trade was more
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Figure 2.10: Economic Conditions in Nigeria 1995-2015
important towards the end of the sample period.
In November 2006, Nigerian authorities enacted Memorandum 21 of the Foreign Exchange






















1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Nigeria 95% Confidence Interval
synthetic Nigeria
Source: BIS & Authors' Calculations
Capital Controls on Inflows Imposed in 2006
Nigeria Cross-border Lending





















Nigeria 95% Confidence Interval
synthetic Nigeria
Source: World Bank & Authors' Calculations
Capital Controls on Inflows Imposed in 2006
Nigeria Private Credit
(b) Nigeria Private Credit
Figure 2.11: Financial Stability for Nigeria & the Synthetic Control 1995-2009
Manual which prohibited foreign nationals from purchasing treasury bills with a maturity
of 1 year or less. However, foreign investors that wished to invest in Nigeria at that term
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Figure 2.12: Capital Flows Management for Nigeria & the Synthetic Control 1995-2009
could invest in money market instruments such as commercial paper, negotiable certificates
of deposit, and bankers’ acceptances. This had the effect of increasing the short-term interest
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rate in Nigeria, similar to a conventional capital control. Evidence of this can be seen in
Figure 2.10(b), where the short-term (deposit) interest rate rose following the implementation
of the capital control. While the short-term interest rate is was rising, the lending interest
rate remained steady, driving the interest rate spread from 7.4% in 2006 down to 3.5% in
2008. What’s more, the monetary policy rate decreased from 14% in 2006 to 10% in 2008.
We argue that the rise in short-term interest rate is the result of the statutorily restricted
demand for Nigerian treasury bills.
Capital controls on inflows have a conventional objective of reducing financial vulnera-
bility by limiting the foreign-denominated debt that comes with cross-border lending. We
plot cross-border lending for Nigeria and the counterfactual in Figure 2.11(a). The close fit
of the pre-treatment outcomes observed in Figure 2.11(a) is consistent with the small root
mean squared prediction error (.0807) and relatively balanced predictors given in Table 2.18.
There is a small statistically insignificant difference between the two series in 2005. In 2006,
the year of intervention, cross-border lending to Nigeria were 4.61% higher than they would
have been if Nigeria had not imposed the capital control. The p-value is .5, but the series
are statistically significantly different. The direction of this result is opposite that which is
expected.
Following the imposition of the capital controls in 2006, Nigeria experienced a large esca-
lation in private credit. We plot private credit as observed in Nigeria as well as the synthetic
control in Figure 2.11(b). The synthetic control for Nigerian private credit approximates
the observed series well, and this is demonstrated in the relatively balanced predictors in
Table 2.19. The synthetic control model suggests that the increase in private credit is the
result of the short-term investment restrictions. This result is intuitive; should foreign in-
vestors in Nigeria have a short-term preference for Nigerian assets, we can expect some
substitutability for the other credit instruments like money market funds. Additionally, as
banks’ marginal returns were decreasing over this time period (reflected in the decreasing
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interest rate spread), it is possible that they lend more to compensate for the lower margin
earned per Nigerian Naira loaned. Over the three years following the capital control, credit
was on average 15.52% higher than the counterfactual. This result is significant at the 10%
level with a p-value of .0526, and the 95% confidence intervals shows that the two series are
statistically significantly different. The finding that private credit is higher in the face of
the capital control is consistent with the theoretical framework developed in Magud et al.
(2018), and the extension in Nugent (2018), where the response of short-term capital inflows
to a capital control tax can be negative or positive, depending on country characteristics. In
the Appendix, we discuss additional factors that may influence Nigerian financial markets
during this time frame and describe their inconsistency with the credit growth observed here.
The Nigerian real exchange rate experienced appreciation over the duration of the sample
period, as modeled in Figure 2.12(b). The synthetic counterfactual is an imperfect fit, and
this is evident in the predictor balance in Table 2.20. Because of this poor fit, we are unable
to identify the effect of the capital control on the real exchange rate. Finally, cross-border
deposits from Nigeria are initially well-matched by the synthetic control. Unfortunately, the
observed series and the synthetic control diverged in 2005, one year before the intervention
year. As a result, we are not able to identify the causal effect of the capital control.
2.4.5 Discussion
Our analysis using the synthetic control method lends new evidence that capital controls
not consistent in reaching financial stability objectives. The capital control interventions
led to higher cross-border lending to Russia and lower cross-border lending to Egypt as
expected. However, the interventions led to higher private credit in Russia and higher cross-
border lending and private credit in Nigeria. We expected that the measures would decrease
private credit in Russia as well as cross-border lending and private credit in Nigeria. Nigeria
experienced a distortion in the local market for short-term investment that incentivized
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entering the private credit market. If Nigeria imposed controls more broadly on short-term
capital inflows, we conjecture that private credit would not have increased as dramatically
as we observe. In Russia, the evidence points to the removal of the controls increasing net
inflows, while their role in the standard toolkit is to decrease net inflows. This explains the
higher level of borrowing.
We find evidence that the controls are more consistent in reaching cash flows management
objectives. In fact, all the synthetic control outcomes show the predicted effects. The capital
control interventions led to a lower real exchange rate in Egypt, lower cross-border deposits
from Egypt, and higher cross-border deposits from both Russia and Kenya. These capital
control interventions include both price and quantity restrictions, and changes in controls
on capital inflows and capital outflows.
This new evidence sheds light on what effects can be expected of capital controls and
what characteristics are important for effectiveness. The exchange rate and capital outflows
are consistent targets for capital controls. However, capital controls may have unintended
consequences in terms of the level of borrowing and foreign-denominated debt. We have
learned that the medium (price or quantity) appears not to matter, but the scope of the
policy does matter. Note that we have assessed how well a capital control has performed in
reaching its conventional objective. The cost of implementing this kind of policy is important
to consider. The important contributions of Forbes (2007) and Alfaro et al. (2017b) document
the costs of capital controls at the firm level, and find that the costs are particularly pervasive
for the smallest firms. On the other hand, Korinek (2011) reconciles that the increase in the
cost of capital is the capital control doing its job.
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2.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we describe the placebo simulations that we use to assess the uncertainty
in the results following Abadie et al. (2010). We re-estimate each of the models that we
have used to evaluate the impact of the capital control events on the outcome variables. We
obtain the sampling variation required for an assessment of the uncertainty in the results
by implementing the synthetic control method, treating each country in a donor pool as the
intervention country and shifting the intervention country to the donor pool. We carry out
these simulations for the four the outcome variables with each of the intervention countries
and their corresponding donor pools.
Using the placebo simulations, we derive a distribution of ‘gaps’ for cross-border lend-
ing, private credit, real exchange rates, and cross-border deposits. The gaps represent the
distance between the synthetic and observed series. A narrow (wide) gap pre-intervention
is a signal of an accurate (poor) synthetic control. A narrow (wide) gap post-intervention is
a signal of a small (large) treatment effect. This distribution of gaps provides the sampling
variation that helps to determine whether our results are driven by chance. If there are many
placebos with large post-treatment gaps, then it is likely that out result is driven by chance
only. If, for example, Nigeria’s post-treatment gap is one of the largest, then we can rule out
the the possibility that the results are driven by chance.
Figures 2.13– 2.16 display the results for the placebo simulations for each of the interven-
tions across all of the outcome variables. The gray lines represent the gap associated with
each of the donor runs of the simulations. The black lines represent the gap estimated for
Russia, Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, respectively. Following Abadie et al. (2010), we focus
on the donors that have a pre-intervention mean squared prediction error no more than
twice that of Russia, Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya. The intention is to focus on donors with
accurate synthetic controls, ignoring gaps that do not contribute information toward the
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(a) Russia Cross-border Lending (b) Russia Cross-border Deposits
(c) Russia Private Credit (d) Russia Real Exchange Rate
Figure 2.13: Placebo Simulations for Russia 1995-2010
sampling variation.
Russia removed controls on capital outflows in 2007. As confirmed by the placebo simu-
lations in Figure 2.13, this had significant effects on cross-border lending and private credit.
Cross-border lending increased by 19.38% over the three years following the removal of the
capital controls, and private credit increased by 6.325% in the same time. Russia’s outcomes
lie in the tails of the distributions of the post-intervention placebo gaps in Figures 2.13(a)
and 2.13(c). On the other hand, the gaps for cross-border deposits and the real exchange
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(a) Egypt Cross Border Lending (b) Egypt Cross-border Deposits
(c) Egypt Private Credit (d) Egypt Real Exchange Rate
Figure 2.14: Placebo Simulations for Egypt 1995-2011
rate are large pre-intervention and are in the middle of the post-intervention placebo gab
distribution.
The placebo simulations for Egypt are plotted in Figure 2.14. The case of cross-border
lending to Egypt demonstrates the importance of completing placebo simulations. We found
lower cross-border lending to Egypt immediately following the change in capital controls
and a statistically significant difference as given by a 95% confidence interval. However,
the placebo simulations in Figure 2.14(a) show that the Egypt gap is in the middle of the
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(a) Kenya Cross-border Lending (b) Kenya Cross-border Deposits
(c) Kenya Private Credit (d) Kenya Real Exchange Rate
Figure 2.15: Placebo Simulations for Kenya 1995-2010
placebo distribution. This means that the 29.04% decrease in cross-border lending that we
predict could be due to chance. Cross-border lending to Egypt and the real exchange rate
are also in the middle of the distribution. We find that the gap in private credit lies in the
tail of the placebo distribution but the gap becomes slightly negative before 2008.
In the three years following the removal of controls on capital inflows in Kenya, we observe
a 20.57% increase in cross-border deposits to BIS reporting banks. Figure 2.15(b) plots the
gaps for cross-border deposits for Kenya and the countries in the donor pool. We see that
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(a) Nigeria Cross-border Lending (b) Nigeria Cross-border Deposit
(c) Nigeria Private Credit (d) Nigeria Real Exchange Rate
Figure 2.16: Placebo Simulations for Nigeria 1995-2009
Kenya is in the tail of the post-intervention placebo distribution. The other three outcomes
are also plotted in Figure 2.15. We could not make conclusions regarding these outcomes
above and we can see that this is due to large pre-intervention gaps and/or being in the
middle of the post-intervention distribution.
We have plotted the placebo simulations for Nigeria in Figure 2.16. The 15.52% increase
in private credit that we predicted over the three years following the imposition of controls on
capital inflows is clearly in the tail of the distribution of the placebo gabs in Figure 2.16(c).
CHAPTER 2. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPITAL CONTROLS 58
The gap for cross-border lending in the intervention year is in the tail distribution. The
large pre-intervention gap in Figure 2.16(a) decreases the credibility of this prediction.
The placebo simulations lend credibility to our analysis using both methods above by
showing that the events that we study lie in the tails of the distributions of outcome gaps.
The placebo simulations rule out the possibility that our results could be driven entirely by
chance. We confirm that removing controls on outflows in Russia had a large, positive effect
on both cross-border lending and private credit. We also confirm that changing controls in
Egypt had a large, negative effect on private credit. This result lends credibility to both
the synthetic control analysis and the difference-in-difference analysis. We provide addi-
tional evidence that removing controls from inflows in Kenya had a large, positive effect on
cross-border deposits. Finally, our placebo simulations demonstrate that imposing controls
on inflows in Nigeria had a large, positive effect on private credit and a smaller effect on
cross-border lending. It is worth mentioning that the results on the real exchange rate for
each intervention could be mixed because we do not consider exchange rate policy. It is
well document that the capital controls and exchange rate policy can serve as complements
(Bianchi, 2011; Benigno et al., 2016).
2.6 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE
A natural point of comparison for policy evaluation with the synthetic control method is
difference-in-difference. The estimators with both methods are based on the Rubin (1974)
potential outcomes framework where outcomes for some unit(s) that experience an inter-
vention are compared to units that do not experience the intervention. Many authors have
looked at the differential performance of the two methods11. Notably, ONeill et al. (2016)
use Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate difference-in-difference against methods that assume
11Arkhangelsky et al. (2019); Doudchenko and Imbens (2016); Powell (2018); Strezhnev (2017)
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independence conditional on past outcomes. The authors find that the alternative methods
provide less biased estimates of the treatment effects when parallel trends assumption is
violated.
We will use difference-in-difference to evaluate the use of capital controls. We compare the
results of the difference-in-difference analysis to the synthetic control models above. Finally,
following ONeill et al. (2016), we test the strength of the alternative identifying assumptions.
We will show that the parallel trends assumption is violated for our environment but that
independence conditional on past outcomes holds. The viability of independence conditional
on past outcomes adds to the credibility of the analysis using the synthetic control models.
A methodical distinction between the two methods is that the synthetic control method
is able to evaluate the effect of a policy for a single treated unit. Conversely, the difference-
in-difference method is traditionally estimated using panel data with multiple units in both
the treated and the control groups. Our strategy above is framed such that we identify and
evaluate specific statutory measures on a country by country basis. In this section, we re-
frame the approach by re-coding the intervention dates as the years when a capital control
is currently imposed and pooling intervention countries by inflows (outflows) controls. This
approach enables us to exploit the kind of variation required by the difference-in-difference
method and is comparable to the analysis in the previous sections. The caveat of this
approach is that there is documented evidence that the effectiveness of capital controls
decreases over time (Eichengreen and Rose, 2014). We do not have information on when
Russia nor Kenya first imposed the capital controls that we study.
We use the donor pool constructed for Egypt as the control group for countries with
controls on capital outflows. This group of countries, listed in Table 2.24, did not generally
use controls on capital outflows for the duration of the sample period and therefore serves
as a good control group. Likewise, we use the donor pool constructed for Nigeria listed in
Table 2.22 as the control groups for countries with controls on capital inflows.
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Table 2.3: Difference in Differences–Inflows Controls
Dependent Variable: CBL Credit RER CBD
Log Exchange Rate -0.388 -19.72˚ -0.438˚˚
(0.237) (9.606) (0.167)
Interest Rate 0.0142˚˚ 0.537˚˚ -0.000319 0.00210
(0.00524) (0.244) (0.00203) (0.00627)
Bank Return on Equity -0.00503˚˚˚ -0.193˚ -0.000147 -0.00362˚˚
(0.00136) (0.0981) (0.000632) (0.00150)
Log GDP 1.295˚˚˚ -0.413˚˚˚ 0.652˚˚˚
(0.234) (0.0452) (0.148)
Inflation -0.00656˚˚ -0.232˚ 0.00215˚˚˚ -0.00485˚
(0.00245) (0.114) (0.000592) (0.00271)
Natural Resources 0.0113 0.454˚ 0.00264 0.0185
(0.0108) (0.247) (0.00224) (0.0115)
Inflows Controls -0.118 3.673˚ 0.199˚˚˚ 0.181˚˚˚
(0.402) (1.873) (0.0443) (0.0602)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 489 479 489 489
Countries 25 25 25 25
Within R2 0.782 0.287 0.774 0.782
Standard errors in parentheses
˚ p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
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Table 2.4: Difference in Differences–Outflows Controls
Dependent Variable: CBL Credit RER CBD
Log Exchange Rate -0.163 -17.90˚˚ -0.215
(0.195) (7.197) (0.160)
Interest Rate 0.00974 0.169 0.00129 -0.00527
(0.00835) (0.246) (0.00152) (0.00648)
Bank Return on Equity -0.00412˚˚˚ -0.230˚˚ 0.000121 -0.00394˚˚
(0.00135) (0.0987) (0.000532) (0.00154)
Log GDP 1.390˚˚˚ -0.417˚˚˚ 0.511˚˚˚
(0.262) (0.0541) (0.127)
Inflation 0.0000910 -0.0177 0.000185˚ 0.000523
(0.000484) (0.0169) (0.000103) (0.000316)
Natural Resources -0.00378 0.231 0.00441 0.00634
(0.0114) (0.253) (0.00318) (0.0120)
Outflows Controls 0.0849 -22.94˚˚˚ 0.0119 -0.590˚˚˚
(0.622) (4.834) (0.0187) (0.172)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 650 635 630 650
Countries 34 34 33 34
Within R2 0.763 0.378 0.737 0.736
Overall R2 0.852 0.120 0.185 0.747
Standard errors in parentheses. ˚ p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
CBL: Cross-border Loans; RER: Real Exchange Rate; CBD: Cross-border Deposits
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The identification of the treatment affect using difference-in-difference is different from
the synthetic control method. Difference-in-difference uses all countries in the donor pool
equally to create a weighted average outcome for an estimate of the counterfactual. Addi-
tionally, the identifying assumption with differences-in-differences is parallel trends. That
is, the potential outcomes for the control group are assumed to be independent from being
assigned to the capital control intervention, conditional on observed covariates, year and
country fixed effects. We evaluate the strength of this assumption in sensitivity analysis,
and show that is does not hold.
The difference-in-difference estimating equation is expressed in Equation 2.7,
Yit “ Xitβ ` λµi ` δt ` αDit ` εit (2.7)
where Xit is the vector of covariates, µi and δt are the country and year fixed effects,
Dit is a dummy variable equal to one for the intervention countries during the intervention
years, and α is the average treatment effect for the treatment group. Equation 2.7 will be
estimated for countries that use controls on capital outflows separately from countries that
use controls on capital inflows. The outflows intervention countries are Russia and Egypt.
The inflows intervention countries are Kenya and Nigeria. We use the common covariates
from the previous section except when they are included in the dependent variable.
The difference-in-difference estimates for all four outcomes and both groups of countries
are organized in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. The final row of Table 2.3 contains the capital control
inflows effects on the set of outcomes. We find that the use of controls on inflows increased
private credit by 3.67 percentage points, increased (depreciated) the exchange rate by 19.9
percentage points, and increased cross-border deposits by 18.1 percentage points. The effect
in the regression on the exchange rate is unique due to the negative sign. The coefficient on
the intervention indicator is similar in magnitude to the previous results on the exchange
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rate and is in the expected direction of a control on capital inflows.
The final row of Table 2.4 contains the capital control outflows effects on the set of
outcomes. The use of controls on outflows decreased private credit by 22.94 percentage
points and decreased cross-border deposits by 59 percentage points. These effects are almost
twice the treatment effects for Egypt as estimated by the synthetic control method, however
are in the same direction. The results of the difference-in-difference analysis as they relate
to Egypt and Nigeria corroborate the mixed effectiveness for financial stability objectives
and the observation that the scope of the capital control policy matters.
2.6.1 Identifying Assumptions
A key identifying assumption of the synthetic control method is independence conditional on
past outcomes. This means that countries with similar outcomes in the pre-intervention pe-
riod are expected to have similar potential intervention-free outcomes in the post-intervention
period, conditional on the observed covariates. The identifying assumption of difference-in-
difference is parallel trends. Under this assumption, a potential outcome is independent of
intervention assignment, conditional on observed covariates and fixed effects.
We follow ONeill et al. (2016) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) in the assessment
of the strength of these identifying assumptions. To assess the strength of the parallel
trends assumption, we estimate the following modified version of the difference-in-difference
estimand on the pre-intervention observations:
Yit “ Xitβ ` λµi ` δt ``φtδtDit ` αDit ` εit. (2.8)
ONeill et al. (2016) show that if the parallel trends assumption holds, the coefficient φt
on the interaction term between the year fixed effects and the intervention indicator will be
zero. After executing the test for every pre-intervention year, should we find that parallel
CHAPTER 2. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPITAL CONTROLS 64
trends holds pre-intervention, then we have additional confidence that parallel trends holds
post-intervention.
ONeill et al. (2016) suggest a lagged dependent variable model to test the independence
conditional on past outcomes assumption using the last pre-intervention period:




φjYij ` αDit ` εit. (2.9)
If the independence conditional on past outcomes assumption holds, the coefficient α
on the treated dummy Dit will be zero in the last pre-intervention period. Our method of
empirically testing the identifying assumption is the same here: should we find evidence that
the assumption holds pre-intervention, then we can safely assume that it continues to hold
post-intervention. If instead we find that the identifying assumption does not hold in the
pre-intervention period, then we have substantive evidence that the assumption does not
hold generally.
We present the results of these tests in Table 2.5. The first two columns contain the
results of the test of the parallel trends assumption. We report the p-values from an F-test
of the joint significance of the φt coefficients across all years. The null hypothesis that the
φt coefficients in Equation 2.8 are zero is rejected for all outcomes and all countries. This
means that the parallel trends assumption does not hold pre-intervention, so the assumption
does not hold generally.
The second two columns contain the results of the tests on the assumption of indepen-
dence conditional on past outcomes. The p-values from a t-test of the significance of the
α coefficient on the intervention dummy in Equation 2.9 in the last pre-intervention period
are reported. In all but three cases, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that this coefficient
is different from zero. In other words, the identifying assumption of the synthetic control
method holds, generally.
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Table 2.5: Identifying Assumptions
Parallel Trends Independence/Past Outcomes
Outcome p-value Result p-value Result
Egypt CBL 0.0000 Reject 0.107 Fail to Reject
Credit 0.0000 Reject 0.059 Reject
RER 0.0000 Reject 0.147 Fail to Reject
CBD 0.0000 Reject 0.856 Fail to Reject
Russia CBL 0.0000 Reject 0.373 Fail to Reject
DC 0.0144 Reject 0.584 Fail to Reject
EX 0.0000 Reject 0.274 Fail to Reject
CBD 0.0000 Reject 0.095 Reject
Kenya CBL 0.0000 Reject 0.471 Fail to Reject
DC 0.0003 Reject 0.721 Fail to Reject
EX 0.0000 Reject
CBD 0.0737 Reject 0.323 Fail to Reject
Nigeria CBL 0.0000 Reject 0.062 Reject
DC 0.0260 Reject 0.824 Fail to Reject
EX 0.0000 Reject 0.824 Fail to Reject
CBD 0.0000 Reject 0.824 Fail to Reject
2.7 CONCLUSION
The effectiveness of capital controls is a subject where many questions remain. We add new
evidence on the effectiveness of capital controls with respect to commonly cited financial sta-
bility and cash flows management measures. The evidence that we describe here is important
for two reasons. First, we study specific statutory measures in Russia, Egypt, Kenya, and
Nigeria which have not been previously evaluated. Second, we model the effects of these
measures using the synthetic control method, solving the endogeneity problem between the
decision to make these statutory measures and the outcome variables of interest.
The new evidence suggests that capital controls are not consistent in reaching conven-
tional financial stability objectives. The removal of controls on capital outflows in Russia led
to higher cross-border lending and the imposition of the same controls in Egypt as predicted.
The outflows measures in Russia and Egypt led to the changes in cross-border lending that
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we would expect. However, the outflows measures in Russia did not decrease private credit,
nor did the inflows measures in Nigeria. This result can be understood within the framework
of Magud et al. (2018), where we see that the response to a capital control does not need
to be negative. These responses may also be understood through the scope at which the
controls were imposed. In Nigeria, a very narrow control on short-term capital inflows was
imposed. We find evidence that suggests that this led to substitution among short-term
instruments, increasing the supply of credit to the domestic market. Our takeaway from this
is that scope matters.
The evidence also shows that capital controls are consistent in reaching cash flows man-
agement objectives. The removal of controls from capital outflows in Russia and from capital
inflows in Kenya led to higher cross-border deposits to BIS reporting banks. The imposition
of outflows controls in Egypt led to lower cross-border deposits and a lower real exchange
rate. This is new evidence that a control on capital outflows can limit the level of outflows
and is able to stem upward exchange rate pressure.
The principle caveat with this research is that we have evaluated the effects of these
capital controls on financial stability and cash flows management during relatively normal
times. None of these countries faced the kind of financial crisis discussed in the literature as
an important motive for capital controls. If these economies did face such a crisis, we would
not be able to model their outcomes using the synthetic control method because the country
in crisis would be very different from the donor pool countries and we could not estimate a
credible synthetic control.
Future research would make an important contribution to the literature by modeling the
statutory measures studied here using a small open economy. Researchers might simulate
the effectiveness of the capital controls in the face of capital surges or capital flight. Other
future research may consider the increased cost of capital for firms that results from the
use of capital controls. How does this trade-off with the increased output that results from
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better economic resilience? Additional evidence on the effects of capital controls at the firm
level would both help the literature to evolve and policymakers to make informed decisions.
2.8 APPENDIX
Table 2.6: Russia Log Cross Border Lending
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Log Exchange Rate 2.950 2.316
Bank Return on Equity 16.23 8.220
Natural Resource Rents 14.93 4.135
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Table 2.7: Russia Private Credit
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Merchandise Trade 48.88 81.22
Log Exchange Rate 2.950 3.552
Interest Rate 12.29 14.20












Table 2.8: Russia Real Foreign Exchange Rate
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Bank Return on Equity 16.23 17.59
Natural Resources Rents 14.93 21.27
Merchandise Trade 48.88 104.04
Interest Rate 12.29 18.61
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Table 2.9: Russia Log Cross Border Deposits
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Log Exchange Rate 2.950 1.659
Bank Return on Equity 16.23 12.88
Merchandise Trade 48.88 49.19
Interest Rate 12.29 4.730
Log Gross Domestic Product 26.72 26.36








Table 2.10: Egypt Log Cross Border Lending
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Log Exchange Rate 1.466 1.646
Interest Rate 8.541 9.128
Bank Return on Equity 13.95 11.33
Log Gross Domestic Product 25.19 24.82
Inflation 6.361 6.320
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Table 2.11: Egypt Private Credit
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Bank Return on Equity 11.12 10.52
Log Exchange Rate 1.575 2.585











Table 2.12: Egypt Real Foreign Exchange Rate
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Private Credit by Banks 49.51 55.69
Bank Return on Assets 11.12 3.69
Inflation 6.162 5.161
Interest Rate 8.084 13.14
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Table 2.13: Egypt Log Cross Border Deposits
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Log Exchange Rate 1.466 2.608
Merchandise Trade 27.55 75.06
Private Credit from Banks 46.44 66.46
Log Gross Domestic Product 25.19 25.40
Interest Rate 8.541 3.641












Table 2.14: Kenya Log Cross Border Lending
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Log Exchange Rate 4.232 5.408
Current Account Exports -.2789 -.0622
Domestic Saving 8.928 17.85
Interest Rate 9.025 11.08
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Table 2.15: Kenya Private Credit
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Domestic Saving 8.928 20.29
Bank Return on Equity 18.17 12.19
Interest Rate 9.025 11.46












Table 2.16: Kenya Real Foreign Exchange Rate
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Bank Return on Equity 18.17 16.59
Domestic Saving 8.928 22.19
Interest Rate 9.025 20.74
Merchandise Trade 40.94 80.69







Treatment Effect 19.90 %
RMSPE .0391
p-value .25
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Table 2.17: Kenya Log Cross Border Deposits
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Bank Return on Equity 18.18 12.32
Inflation 10.44 9.446
Log Exchange Rate 4.232 2.143
Domestic Saving 8.928 19.79
Interest Rate 9.025 8.867










Table 2.18: Nigeria Log Cross Border Lending
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Merchandise Trade 60.51 87.17
Bank Return on Equity 17.51 10.05
Log Exchange Rate 4.661 1.659
Interest Rate 12.52 14.99
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Log Gross Domestic Product 24.82 23.16
Log Exchange Rate 4.754 4.682
Interest Rate 13.55 13.36








Table 2.20: Nigeria Real Foreign Exchange Rate
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Bank Return on Assets 17.15 25.88
Merchandise Trade 60.51 62.58
Private Credit by Banks 12.08 10.06
Interest Rate 12.52 12.89
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Table 2.21: Nigeria Log Cross Border Deposits
Predictor Balance
Treated Control
Log Exchange Rate 4.661 1.419
Merchandise Trade 60.51 49.58
Inflation 15.29 8.591
Interest Rate 12.52 10.55











Table 2.22: Donor Pool for Nigeria
Australia El Salvador Ireland Netherlands Uruguay
Belgium France Israel Norway Yemen
Brunei Georgia Italy Panama Zambia
Canada Germany Japan Uganda
Denmark Hungary Latvia United States
Table 2.23: Donor Pool for Kenya
Angola Cóte d’Ivoire Norway Tunisia
Argentina India Philippines Ukraine
Bangladesh Italy Sri Lanka Uzbekistan
China Mauritius Tanzania Venezuela
Colombia Morocco Thailand Vietnam
Yemen
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Table 2.24: Donor Pool for Egypt
Austria Germany Lebanon Portugal
Belgium Guatemala Mauritius Qatar
Brunei Darussalam Ireland Morocco Romania
Bulgaria Israel Netherlands Spain
Canada Italy New Zealand Sweden
Costa Rica Japan Nicaragua Togo
Denmark Kuwait Norway Uganda
France Latvia Panama United Kingdom
United States Uruguay Yemen Zambia
Table 2.25: Donor Pool for Russia
Angola India Mexico Poland Tunisia
Bangladesh Italy Moldova South Africa Uzbekistan
Burkina Faso Jamaica Morocco Sri Lanka Vietnam
China Kazakhstan Norway Tanzania
Colombia Malaysia Pakistan Thailand
Czech Republic Mauritius Philippines Togo
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Table 2.26: Country List
Algeria Czech Rep. Ireland New Zealand Sri Lanka
Angola Denmark Israel Nicaragua Swaziland
Argentina Dominican Rep. Italy Nigeria Sweden
Australia Ecuador Jamaica Norway Switzerland
Austria Egypt Japan Oman Tanzania
Bahrain El Salvador Kazakhstan Pakistan Thailand
Bangladesh Ethiopia Kenya Panama Togo
Belgium Finland Korea, Rep. Paraguay Tunisia
Bolivia France Kuwait Peru Turkey
Brazil Georgia Kyrgyz Rep. Philippines Uganda
Brunei Darussalam Germany Latvia Poland Ukraine
Bulgaria Ghana Lebanon Portugal U.A.E.
Burkina Faso Greece Malaysia Qatar U.K.
Canada Guatemala Malta Romania U.S.A.
Chile Hong Kong Mauritius Russia Uruguay
China Hungary Mexico Saudi Arabia Uzbekistan
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Table 2.27: Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Name Definition and Source
Bank Return on Equity Total Commercial banks after-tax net income to yearly
averaged equity. Source: World Banks Global Financial
Development Database.
Cross Border Positions Loans are defined as those financial assets created through the
lending of funds that are not represented by negotiable
securities. Thus, loans include interbank borrowings and loans
and inter-office balances. Data also comprise foreign
trade-related credits that are included by almost all reporting
countries, with the country of residence of the drawee of the
trade bill generally being the guiding principle for the
geographical allocation of the claims arising from suppliers’
credit. Credits and international loans received and granted
and deposits received and made on a trust basis are also
included. Sale and repurchase transactions (repos) involving
the sale of assets (e.g., securities and gold) with a commitment
to repurchase the same or similar assets, financial leases,
promissory notes, nonnegotiable debt securities, endorsement
liabilities arising from bills rediscounted abroad and
subordinated loans (including subordinated non-negotiable debt
securities) are also reported in this category. Source: Bank for
International Settlements.
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Variable Name Definition and Source
Current Account Exports Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods
and other market services provided to the rest of the world.
They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance,
transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such
as communication, construction, financial, information,
business, personal, and government services. They exclude
compensation of employees and investment income (formerly
called factor services) and transfer payments. Data are in
constant local currency. Source: World Bank national accounts
data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
Domestic Saving
Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP less final
consumption expenditure (total consumption). Source: World
Bank and OECD National Accounts.
Exchange Rate US dollar exchange rates. End of period Source: Bank for
International Settlements.
Gross Domestic Product GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies
not included in the value of the products. It is calculated
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets
or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are
in constant local currency. Source: World Bank national
accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
Inflation
Growth rate of Consumer price index reflects changes in the
cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and
services that may be fixed or changed at yearly. Source: Bank
for International Settlements.
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Variable Name Definition and Source
Interest Rate Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar
banks for demand, time, or savings deposits. The terms and
conditions attached to these rates differ by country, however,
limiting their comparability. Source: International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics and Central Bank.
Merchandise Trade A share of GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and imports
divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars. Source:
World Trade Organization.
Natural Resource Rents Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural
gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest
rents. Source: Estimates based on sources and methods
described in Jarvis et al. (2011).
Private Credit The financial resources provided to the private sector by
domestic money banks as a share of GDP. Domestic money
banks comprise commercial banks and other financial
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand
deposits. Source: World Banks Global Financial Development
Database.
CHAPTER 2. ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CAPITAL CONTROLS 81
Nigerian Economy
Should there exist some other shock to Nigerian financial markets in the same year as the
capital control, and not affect other countries in the donor pool, confounding factors may be
driving the novel results described here.
• In 2007, Nigeria benefited from high oil prices—just under $100 a barrel—however oil
prices surpassed $110 a barrel in 2011 with relatively consistent exports and production.
Additionally, oil rents were a much smaller component of Nigeria’s economy in 2007
than earlier in the sample period.
• In April, 2006, Nigeria paid $12 billion to the Paris Club to write off its $18 billion in
its debt owed. If this one-time deleveraging were driving the results, we would expect
a plateau in private credit demonstrating the increased debt capacity of the Nigerian
economy.
• Finally, the government of Nigeria implemented legislation mandating the conversion
of existing community banks to microfinance banks with lower capital adequacy re-
quirements by December 31, 2007. However, this legislation was ratified on December
15, 2005. Were microfinance institutions driving the results, we would expect to see a
gradual increase in private credit starting in 2006.
Hence, we find the investment restrictions in Nigeria the most compelling factor in explaining
the effects in Figure 2.10.
Chapter 3
Restrictions on Short-term Capital
Inflows and the Response of Direct
Investment
For decades, capital controls have been a controversial policy decision. Throughout the 1980s
and 1990’s, the position of the IMF was clear: liberalize capital markets—remove capital
controls. Nevertheless, volatile capital flows and the subsequent debt crises of the 1990’s
have challenged the IMF’s position. Surges in short-term capital flows have been observed to
invoke systemically-destabilizing volatility, contributing to the 1994 Tequila Crisis in Mexico,
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and the 1998 Russian Financial Crisis1. Many countries
have since used capital controls. Well-studied examples are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and
Malaysia2. However, the evidence on the effectiveness of capital controls is mixed. There
is a general consensus that capital controls are effective at modifying the composition of
1Benmelech and Dvir (2013), Reinhart and Reinhart (2009), Rodrik and Velasco (1999)
2Alfaro et al. (2017b), Forbes (2005b), Forbes et al. (2016), Edison and Reinhart (2001), Edwards and
Rigobon (2009), Edwards (1999), Reinhart and Smith (1998),Kaplan and Rodrik (2002).
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capital flows, but not for stemming the volume of capital flows3. The growing evidence
on capital controls and their role in cash flows management is evident in the evolution of
the IMF’s policy guidance. During the 1990’s, the IMF suggested the use of controls on
inflows for just 2 of 27 episodes of surging capital inflows (IMF Independent Evaluation
Office, 2005). Confronted with years of experience with volatile external capital flows, the
IMF faced a need to revise its policy guidance with respect to capital controls. In 2011, the
IMF released a comprehensive research series on capital flows policy guidance that concluded
with the Institutional View on the Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows in which
the IMF recognizes that in certain circumstances, capital flow management measures can be
useful. The IMF stressed that capital controls should not however substitute for warranted
macroeconomic adjustment4.
To the extent that capital controls can mitigate risks attributed to external capital flows,
controls on short-term capital inflows are of particular interest. The maturity structure of
short-term capital flows enables sustained surges in inflows to be followed by a sudden reversal
with a shift in market conditions (Calvo, 1998). The volatility of short-term capital flows
can destabilize financial markets that are underdeveloped. Exposure to volatility through
external capital flows is a common motive for capital controls, and I find that controls are
commonly used. Since 2007, more than 1 in 2 economies have used restrictions on short-term
capital inflows, and more than 1 in 4 economies have added restrictions in the same time5.
With controls on short-term capital inflows persistent if not growing in use, it is worthwhile
to ask what an economy gives up by imposing this particular capital control? This paper
focuses specifically on the relationship between capital controls on short-term capital inflows
3Forbes et al. (2015), Ostry et al. (2011), Kose et al. (2009), Carlson and Hernandez (2002), Montiel and
Reinhart (1999).
4International Monetary Fund (2010), International Monetary Fund (2011b), International Monetary
Fund (2011a), International Monetary Fund (2012), International Monetary Fund (2011c), Arora et al.
(2013)
5Information derived from the IMF’s AREAER report (Fernández et al., 2015)
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and the level of direct investment inflows; does an economy give up its direct investment in
using a capital control on short-term capital inflows? Further, I consider the conditions under
which capital controls on short-term capital inflows might be useful or harmful for direct
investment. This will be important for policymakers reviewing the use of capital controls in
the case that the policymaker values the level of direct investment inflows.
Using a new dataset by Fernández et al. (2015) with information on capital control mea-
sures covering 100 countries over the years 1995–2015 and panel data fixed effects regression,
I find that countries which use capital controls on short-term capital inflows receive a higher
level of direct investment inflows. Further, I find that this effect is decreasing in the coun-
try’s per capita growth rate. Thus, lower (higher) growth countries that use restrictions
on short-term capital inflows have higher (lower) direct investment inflows, all else equal.
The evidence shows that the use of controls on short-term capital inflows serves as a signal
of stability to attract investors to lower-growth countries. If an investor enters a country
that is growing slowly conditional on the capital control, that investor must expect that the
country must at least be a stable environment for their investment. This result is consistent
with Cordella (2003), where capital control policy increases the expected return on invest-
ment, thereby increasing capital inflows. I test this relationship in alternative specifications,
including instrumental variables panel data random effects regression and Arellano-Bond
generalized method of moments. Policy questions concerning capital flows carry significant
implications for reverse causality—this is addressed in the paper using the alternative spec-
ifications and I confirm that the results hold.
The essay proceeds as follows. The next section presents a brief literature review. Fol-
lowing the literature review is a discussion on the theoretical background which forms the
basis for the empirical work. Next, I present some facts about the data used including the
dataset used as the capital controls index. The following section contains the results of the
baseline model. After discussing the baseline results, I re-estimate the baseline model using
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instrumental variables, then discuss sensitivity analysis. The final section concludes.
3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW
Capital flows management is an important branch of the international economics literature.
The Research Department at the IMF has published several working papers that serve as the
analytical basis for the policy guidance series on capital flows discussed in the introduction6.
The IMF’s revised policy guidance recognizes the capacity for capital controls to address
macroeconomic and financial stability concerns in the face of inflow surges, only after all
macroeconomic and exchange rate policy options have been exhausted (Ostry et al., 2011).
The IMF’s revised position on capital controls highlights the substantial trade-offs that
a policymaker must consider when evaluating a capital control. These trade-offs remain
unsettled in the literature on many of the objectives that have been associated with capital
controls. Forbes et al. (2015) find little support that capital controls are effective in any of
15 objectives. Forbes et al. (2015) however do not consider restrictions at the granular level
like short-term capital inflows, nor do they study the influence of capital controls on direct
investment. Several studies have found that capital controls push the maturity composition
of external capital flows towards more long-term flows such as direct investment, but do not
have an effect on the volume of external capital flows (Montiel and Reinhart, 1999; Carlson
and Hernandez, 2002; Alfaro et al., 2005). Many studies have also found that capital controls
improve growth resilience or reduce the vulnerability to crisis (Qureshi et al., 2011; Gupta
et al., 2007; Edwards and Rigobon, 2009; Pyun and An, 2016) but there is evidence that
this comes at the expense of efficiency losses and market discipline (Cardarelli et al., 2010;
Forbes, 2005b). Finally, there is an important branch of this literature which has looked
at the costs of capital controls at the firm/investor level, where lower returns, higher cost
6See Dell’Ariccia et al. (2007), Ghosh et al. (2012), Habermeier et al. (2011), Qureshi et al. (2011), Ghosh
and Qureshi (2016), Ostry et al. (2012), Ostry et al. (2011).
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of firm financing, and lower investment are significant (Alfaro et al., 2017b; Forbes, 2005b;
Forbes et al., 2016).
The contribution of this paper adds to a subset of papers which have studied the economic
consequences of capital controls on particular asset categories as opposed to broadly-defined
capital control indices (e.g. Eichengreen and Rose, 2014; Alfaro et al., 2017b; Asiedu and
Lien, 2004). In a closely related paper, Dell’Erba and Reinhardt (2015) show using an
event study that restrictions on short-term debt flows decrease the likelihood of banking
debt surges but increase the likelihood of financial sector foreign direct investment surges.
The results presented here indicate that slower-growing countries with capital controls on
short-term capital inflows receive higher levels of foreign direct investment. This result is
similar to Dell’Erba and Reinhardt (2015), and is consistent with Cordella (2003), where
foreign lenders in a theoretical economy find it profitable to invest in an emerging market if
and only the emerging government imposes taxes on short-term capital inflows. In Cordella
(2003), the policy imposed on short-term capital inflows can prevent bank-runs, increasing
expected returns to investing and in turn increasing the volume of capital flows.
3.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The focus of this paper is a country-level analysis on the response of direct investment to
capital controls on short-term capital inflows. In the appendix, I extend the framework in
Magud et al. (2018) to characterize the relationship between long-term inflows and a capital
control. Magud et al. (2018) use the portfolio balance approach to identify the optimal
behavior of short-term capital inflows in response to a capital control on short-term capital
inflows. An extension naturally follows, beginning with the optimal portfolio allocation with
respect to long-term inflows. In the second subsection of the theoretical framework section
in the appendix, I establish the optimal behavior of long-term inflows in response to a capital
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control on short-term inflows.
The conditions that describe the optimal behavior of long-term capital inflows when the
economy is subject to a capital control on short-term capital inflows depend on the elasticity
of long-term flows to total flows. Specifically, if the elasticity of direct investment to total
inflows is greater than one, a capital control on short-term capital inflows increases the level
of direct investment. However, if the elasticity of direct investment to total inflows is less
than one, a capital control on short-term inflows leads to a lower level of direct investment.
This means that the way direct investment responds to a capital control on short-term capital
inflows may differ for some countries—increasing in some, decreasing in others. The value
that this elasticity will ultimately take is exogenous to the model.
The objective of this paper is to determine, on average, how direct investment responds to
a capital control on short-term capital inflows. I will also this test whether this relationship
is different for countries that are growing slower or faster. In this way, an objective of this
paper is to test the average sign of this elasticity.
3.3 DATA
I use annual data on net foreign direct investment inflows from 1995–2015 for 100 countries.
Data on the determinants for direct investment is sourced from World Bank’s World Devel-
opment Indicators and the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.
Additional data is obtained in the Gurevich and Herman (2018) Dynamic Gravity Dataset.
The data for capital controls is provided by the new dataset presented in Fernández et al.
(2015). Data on the level of institutional quality is provided by the Fraser Institute’s Eco-
nomic Freedom of the World database, which measures the degree to which the policies
and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom. Additional measures on
institutional quality are obtained from the World Governance Indicators project, which are
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published with the World Development Indicators by World Bank. Finally, data for in-
strumental variables is obtained on legal origins from Porta et al. (1998), on central bank
independence from Garriga (2016), and political institutions from Cruz et al. (2016a). A
complete list of the variables with their definitions and their sources is included in the ap-
pendix. In the following, I will provide a brief description of the Fernández et al. (2015)
dataset and how it is used in this paper, as well as some facts regarding the data in general.
3.3.1 Capital Control Measures
The capital control measures used in this paper originate in a new dataset made available
by Fernández et al. (2015). Using information in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), Fernández et al. (2015) build on a
dataset presented in Schindler (2009). Fernández et al. (2015) further disaggregate the capital
control measures by 10 distinct capital asset categories and by the direction of flows for 100
countries from 1995–20157. The capital control measures draw from the de jure information
contained in the IMF’s AREAER. De jure information in this context is correlated with
official rules and practices, referring to the state of affairs in accordance with the law. In
contrast, de facto information would measure actual outcomes, the extent to which rules and
practices are enforced, independent of their official status.
Capital control measures by definition restrict capital transactions on the basis of resi-
dency, limiting capital mobility between residents and non-residents. There exist two types
of capital inflow transactions and two types of capital outflow transactions on which most
capital controls can be imposed. Table 3.1 distinguishes each type of transaction according
to the residency of the initiating party and the direction of flow. Transactions that result in
inflows or outflows can be initiated by a resident or non-resident. For example, the transac-
7Schindler (2009) covers restrictions for 91 countries from 1995–2005 on inflows and outflows over 6 asset
categories.
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tion recorded as a purchase locally by non-resident is a non-resident transaction and a capital
inflow. An example of this transaction would be a Mexican firm purchasing a United States
bond, where the United States is the home country.
Table 3.1: Capital Transactions by Residency and Flow Direction
Capital Outflow Capital Inflow
Resident Transaction Purchase Abroad Sale or Issue Abroad
by Resident by Resident
Example United States firm United States firm
purchases Mexican bond sells bond in Mexico
Non-resident Transaction Sale/Issue Locally Purchase Locally
by Non-resident by Non-resident
Example Mexican firm sells Mexican firm purchases
bond in the United States United States bond
Fernández et al. (2015) use the narrative description in the AREAER to determine
whether a restriction on any of the four transactions in Table 3.1 are present. Additionally,
Fernández et al. (2015) repeat this procedure across 10 capital asset categories, including
short-term capital (money market instruments). With this information, I build a set of cap-
ital control dummies for money market inflows and direct investment inflows in addition to
an aggregate capital control index. The first money market inflows dummy variable equals
one in a given year when a country only uses one of the restrictions in the second column of
Table 3.1: either a restriction on a sale or issue abroad by a resident or a restriction on a local
purchase by a non-resident. The second money market inflows dummy variable equals one
in a given year when a country uses restrictions on both transactions in the second column
of Table 3.1. I create a dummy variable for capital controls on direct investment inflows, and
an aggregate control index over the remaining 8 capital asset categories, excluding money
market instruments and direct investment8. The event that a country uses zero restrictions
8The remaining 8 asset categories are bonds and other debt with maturity of more than one year, equity,
collective investment, financial credit, derivatives, guarantees and sureties, and real estate.
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on inflows transactions serves as the numeraire for each asset-specific set of dummy variables.
Figure 3.1: Money Market Inflows Capital Controls
While some countries have placed restrictions on money market inflows and money mar-
ket outflows at the same time, these instruments have objectives which are theoretically
opposing. Forbes et al. (2015) observe that increasing controls on inflows and decreasing
controls on outflows are policy decisions that are meant to address strong net capital in-
flows, currency appreciation, rapid credit growth, and the related vulnerabilities. Likewise,
removing controls on inflows but increasing controls on outflows theoretically address sudden
stops, currency depreciation, or a contraction in credit. What’s more, restrictions on inflows
help to prevent (rather than to respond to) crises, and they are considered to decrease uncer-
tainty and increase transparency by providing creditors information regarding transaction
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costs at the beginning of a transaction (Ocampo and Stiglitz, 2008). Finally, capital controls
on outflows have been associated with meeting budgetary needs through financial repression.
This last objective is not associated with capital controls on inflows, but is observed to have
contributed to the unfavorable perception of capital controls, generally (Ghosh and Qureshi,
2016). As a result of the opposing policy objectives for capital controls in the two different
directions, I focus on controls on money market inflows.
Using the detailed nature of the Fernández et al. (2015) dataset, I can determine the
incidence of capital control restrictions specific to money market inflows. Following Table
3.1, a country can impose zero, one, or two restrictions on money market inflows. Three
trends are evident in Figure 3.1. The country-level incidence for each of the three possible
quantities of restrictions used on money market inflows over the years 1995–2015 is plotted
in Figure 3.1. Countries that use either one or two restrictions tend to assume near equal
parts of just less than half the sample, while countries that use no restrictions make up the
remaining lion’s share. Second, the importance of money market capital controls increases
in the late 1990’s in the wake of several debt crises. The frequency of money market capital
controls decrease slightly before the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, and increases again
following Global Financial Crisis. The number of countries that use no restrictions falls
from 66 in 1995 to 56 in 1997, grows to 66 in 2006, but then steadily falls to 58 in 2013.
The number of countries that use one of the restrictions have fallen since the financial crisis,
from 23 countries in 2008 to 20 countries in 2015. However, the country-level incidence of
two restrictions is steadily increasing following the global financial crisis from 16 countries
in 2008 to 22 countries in 2015.
The relative frequency of the three levels of money market inflows capital controls is sta-
ble over the duration of the sample period. Countries that have zero restrictions on money
market inflows consists approximately of three-fifths of the sample, and countries that have
one or two restrictions make up about one-fifth of the sample for the duration of the sample
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period. However, the stability in relative frequency masks significant temporal variation
at the country level. In each year from 1995–2015, there exists at least one country adding
restrictions on money market inflows and one country removing restrictions from money mar-
ket inflows. Figure 3.2 is a histogram with the frequency of countries adding and removing
controls in each year of the sample. There appears to be more countries changing controls
in the beginning of the period than the end of the period, with the number of countries
removing controls in much higher frequency in the beginning of the sample period. However,
in any given year over the sample period, there are more countries adding restrictions than
removing restrictions, with 11 years that have more countries adding restrictions versus 6
years that have more countries removing restrictions. A caveat of this illustration is that
the dynamics in the various quantities of restrictions are pooled. In the subsection of the
Appendix on data visualization, the histogram in Figure 3.4 breaks down the frequencies re-
specting each of the three ways a country can add restrictions and the three ways a country
can remove restrictions.
3.3.2 Summary Statistics
The dependent variable in the baseline model of this paper is the level of net direct investment
inflows (FDI) as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Measuring FDI and its
determinants as a percentage of GDP provides cross-country comparability for these variables
in a panel data setting. The conventional definition of foreign direct investment is cross-
border investment made by a resident in one economy with the objective of establishing a
lasting interest in a firm which resides in an economy other than that of the direct investor.
Lasting interest indicates that the direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting power of
the firm, which is meant to signal a long-term investment relationship (OECD, 1998). Direct
investment is expected to outlive cyclical movements in output, FDI is robust to economic
volatility and short-term movements in interest rates (Ramey and Ramey, 1995). FDI tends
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Figure 3.2: Changes in Money Market Inflows Capital Controls
not to be associated with the characteristics of “hot money,” capital flows that lead to surges
and sudden stops (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2009). For these reasons and the notion that FDI
crowds in domestic investment, policymakers particularly value the level of foreign direct
investment.
Average9 foreign direct investment and short-term debt flows for 1995–2015 are plotted
in Figure 3.3. The countries have been separated into two groups. The first group consists
of countries that have capital controls on money market inflows for the entire period or have
introduced the controls by 2007 and are left in place for the remainder of the sample period.
The second group consists of countries that have never had capital controls in place or have
9The average is the cumulative percent of the cumulative GDP for each group of countries.
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removed them before 2007 and never introduced them again. The first group of countries is
represented by the solid line in Figures 3.3(a) and 3.3(b), the second group is represented
by the dashed line. The first group has markedly higher direct investment than the second
group for almost the entirety of the sample period. The first group of countries—those using
controls the entire period or have introduced by controls by 2007—also tends to have higher
net flows on external short-term debt. Net flows on short-term debt appear more volatile
than net foreign direct investment, as expected. Average direct investment reaches a high
of about 4% of GDP in 1999 and again in 2007 before the Global Financial Crisis, while
average net flows on external short-term debt reach a high of 2.5% in 2010 during the height
of the Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policy program. While the two groups
track each other more closely in Figure 3.3(b), this could be evidence of reverse causality.
Reverse causality is a principal objective of this paper and is addressed in the instrumental
variables and sensitivity analysis sections.
Table 3.2 provides the summary statistics for the continuous variables used in this study,
including the determinants of annual foreign direct investment inflows according to the base-
line specification. There is a large set of literature on the determinants of foreign direct in-
vestment. The determinants chosen here follow research relevant for external factors affecting
FDI flows. Eicher et al. (2012) uses Bayesian model averaging to identify, in probabalistic
terms, which determinants are the most important for direct investment inflows. Alfaro
et al. (2008) examine determinants of capital flows with an emphasis on the level of in-
stitutional quality. Blonigen (2005) provides a comprehensive survey on the determinants
of direct investment. These three studies jointly identify trade effects, factor endowments,
exchange rates, FDI frictions, institutions, the growth rate, and infrastructure as important
determinants for foreign direct investment.
Trade effects follow an important motivation for FDI: export substitution to a host coun-
try. From the prospective of the host country, this is import substitution. Countries with
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Figure 3.3: Average Capital Flows 1995-2015
larger import markets are expected to attract more FDI. The size of a country’s capital
endowment also attracts more FDI (Lucas, 1990; Bergstrand and Egger, 2007). The capital
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endowment is captured by gross fixed capital formation. Infrastructure is closely tied to a
direct investor’s expected return to investment. Strong infrastructure10, measured by the
rate of telephone subscriptions, decreases a firm’s transaction costs, increasing the expected
return on investment. Foreign direct investment is expected to be increasing in the growth
rate, as firms are more likely to establish a stake in countries where a higher future growth
rate is reasonably expected (Carlson and Hernandez, 2002). Additionally, direct investment
is expected to decrease with the appreciation of the exchange rate. To the extent that a
large part of foreign direct investment the result of supply chain dynamics, investors avoid
economies whose export sectors are weakened by strong currencies (McKinnon, 1999). Bloni-
gen (2005) and Eicher et al. (2012) find that legal institutions and property rights as well
as control of corruption are the most important dimensions in terms of institutional quality
for FDI. Finally, to capture FDI frictions, I follow Alfaro et al. (2008) with a measure called
distantness that reflects how remote or distant a country may be from the center of economic
activity.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Mean Median Std Deviation Min Max
FDI Inflows 3.4069 2.4077 4.5869 -15.989 70.010
Gross Fixed Capital .22179 .21936 .05746 .02646 .45514
Legal/Property Rights 5.5540 5.4180 1.610 2.0334 9.1381
Imports 38.154 33.991 17.916 .06470 109.13
Telephone Lines 22.073 16.900 19.119 .10329 74.742
Growth Rate 2.3030 2.3400 3.7917 -25.554 26.510
Exchange Rate .56771 .45632 .33109 .07646 1.856
Central Bank Independence .58247 .57356 .2066 .1345 .904
Observations 2100
The level of net foreign direct investment inflows averages between 2.4% and 3.4% for
the sample. The substantial cross-sectional variation (country-to-country) is evident in the
ranges (as measured by the distance between the minimum and maximum values) of the
10See Kinda (2012) for a detailed investigation on the role infrastructure plays as a driver of FDI flows.
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variables in Table 3.2. This is expected in a sample of 100 countries. The large standard
deviations of FDI, telephone lines, and the growth rate give very large coefficients of variation
adding to the evidence on the substantial cross-sectional variation in the sample used here.
3.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.4.1 Baseline Model
As Figure 3.1 indicates, there is an increase in the number of countries that use capital
controls on money market inflows starting in 2007. More than 1 in 2 economies have used
restrictions on money market inflows since 2007, and more than 1 in 4 have added restrictions
in the same time. Motivated by the increasing frequency of money market capital controls
and their potential cost (e.g. Cardarelli et al., 2010; Forbes, 2005a,b). I use panel data
fixed effects regression in this section to study the relationship between direct investment
inflows and the use of money market inflows capital control policy. Specifically, I ask does an
economy give up its direct investment in using a capital control on money market inflows?
The baseline regression in Table 3.3 is a panel data fixed effects regression, the dependent
variable is foreign direct investment inflows as a percentage of gross domestic product (FDI).
This measure of investment as the dependent variable effectively provides cross-country
comparability in a panel data setting. To investigate the relationship between FDI and
capital controls, I regress dummy variables for money market capital control policy on FDI.
I also test this relationship with an aggregate capital control index. I estimate a panel data
fixed effects specification for the determinants of direct investment inflows:








itξ ` αi ` λt ` εit. (3.1)
In Equation 3.1, FDIit is foreign direct investment inflows as a percent of gross domestic
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product for a country i in year t. The determinants of FDI are included in the vector xit.
The vector cit contains the capital control restrictions which are the feature component. In
addition, the variable dit represents the dummy variable for the capital control on direct
investment inflows. Finally, PCGit is the per capita growth rate, αi are the country fixed
effects and λt are the year fixed effects.
Following Table 3.1, the set of capital controls in cit are the capital controls on money
market inflows MMI1 and MMI2 that track whether a country has one restriction or both
restrictions on money market inflows in a given year. Countries with no restrictions serve as
the numeraire. The determinants of direct investment are included in the baseline model to
determine whether direct investment changes as the result of money market capital controls
or otherwise. An interaction term between money market capital controls and the per capita
growth rate is included to capture the individuality in the capital control prescription. The
interaction will reveal how direct investment responds to policy variation in combination
with the expected local return on investment. I also test this relationship using an aggregate
capital control index (ACI) which covers the eight other asset categories in the Fernández
et al. (2015) dataset for both capital inflows and capital outflows excluding money market
flows and direct investment. I also include capital controls on direct investment inflows in
all regressions when they are present in a given country-year. It is important to be able to
distinguish the effects of capital controls on direct investment inflows and capital controls
on money market inflows.
Table 3.3 contains the results of the baseline fixed effects panel data regressions with
country and year fixed effects. Cyprus, Malta, The Netherlands, Hong Kong, and Singapore
are not included in the final sample due to extreme observations in direct investment or in
the determinants. Kuwait, Ethiopia, Qatar, The United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan are
not included due to data unavailability. The final sample includes 90 countries for the years
1995–2015. The results of the Hausman specification tests rejecting the null hypothesis of no
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Table 3.3: Panel Data Fixed Effects Regression
(1) (2)
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 4.179 4.158
(5.992) (5.829)




Telephone Lines 0.0375 0.0335
(0.0268) (0.0266)
Growth Rate 0.281˚ 0.372˚˚
(0.145) (0.170)




One Money Market Control (MMI1) 0.851˚˚
(0.383)
Both Money Market Controls (MMI2) 0.390
(0.650)
Growth Rate ˆ MMI1 -0.190˚
(0.109)
Growth Rate ˆ MMI2 -0.259˚
(0.132)
FDI Inflows Control 0.416 .517
(0.507) (.529)
Aggregate Control Index (ACI) 0.124
(0.511)
Growth Rate ˆ ACI -0.165˚˚
(0.0707)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 1415 1416
Countries 90 90
Within R2 0.133 0.139
Overall R2 0.140 0.141
Hausman Statistic 35.21 21.66
Panel-robust standard errors in parentheses
˚ p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
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systematic difference in random effects coefficients versus fixed effects coefficients are listed
in the last row of Table 3.3. The joint significance of the year fixed effects is confirmed
by an F -test, not presented here for brevity but available from the author. In the first
column, the growth rate is significant and positive. The coefficient on the dummy variable
for one money market capital control is statistically significant and positive, but this is not
the case for the dummy variable for both money market capital controls. This means that
country-years with one capital control on money market inflows in place have statistically
significantly more direct investment inflows than country-years with no capital controls, but
this result does not hold for country-years with both capital controls on money market
inflows in place. Finally, the interactions of the two capital control dummies with the
growth rate are both statistically significant and negative. The interaction between the
per capita growth rate and money market capital controls indicates that high-growth (low-
growth) countries which impose strong money market capital controls will receive less (more)
direct investment inflows, all else equal. Interpreted jointly, the evidence indicates that the
effects of money market capital control policy on direct investment inflows are larger in
slower-growing countries than in faster-growing countries. A country in the first quartile of
growth rates at 0.59% and that imposes one restriction on money market inflows expects
.851 ´ .190 ˆ 0.59 “ .739 percentage points higher direct investment. Likewise, a country
in the third quartile of growth rates at 4.32% and that imposes one restriction on money
market capital inflows expects .851 ´ .190 ˆ 4.32 “ .03 percentage points higher direct
investment. As the direct investment sample mean is 3.41 percent of GDP, this means
that a typical slower-growing country that imposes capital controls on money market inflows
expects approximately 21.7% higher direct investment, while a typical faster-growing country
expects approximately .88% higher direct investment.
I have shown that the results in Column (1) of Table 3.3 suggest that countries that
use either one of the restrictions on money market inflows receive higher direct investment
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inflows. This is not the case for the Column (2) which contains the estimates including
the aggregate capital control index. A higher value for the aggregate capital control index
represents a broader use of capital controls for a particular country in a given year. The
statistical insignificance of the aggregate control index suggests that on average, capital
controls broadly do not influence the volume of direct investment inflows, all else equal. This
result is consistent with the previous findings of the literature on capital controls (e.g. Montiel
and Reinhart, 1999; Carlson and Hernandez, 2002; Alfaro et al., 2005). I do find a statistically
significant and negative coefficient on the interaction term implying that faster-growing
(slower-growing) countries that impose money market capital controls broadly receive less
(more) direct investment.
The principal outcome from the results reported in Table 3.3 is the statistically significant
and positive coefficient on the money market inflows capital control variable. Previous studies
have predicted significantly higher FDI as a share of total flows, but insignificantly predicted
higher levels of FDI (e.g. Montiel and Reinhart, 1999; Carlson and Hernandez, 2002). This
is the first study to show that a capital control on short-term inflows can lead to a higher
level of direct investment. The theoretical framework introduced in earlier and extended
in the appendix further informs the interpretation of the positive coefficient on the money
market capital control variable. Recall that for the relatively elastic case, a capital control
on short-term debt implies an increase in direct investment flows. This follows from the fact
that an elasticity greater than 1 reflects increasing marginal returns with respect to the level
of direct investment. Finally, the relationship between the growth rate and money market
inflows capital controls also gives insight about the underlying mechanism. As discussed
above, the joint relationship translates in .739 percentage points higher direct investment
for low-growth countries that use money market inflows capital controls, and .03 percentage
points higher direct investment for high-growth countries that use money market inflows
controls. However, exclusive of the capital control, lower-growth countries attract less direct
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investment, not more (given the statistically significant and positive coefficient on the growth
rate). These conditions support the interpretation that investors perceive capital controls
on money market inflows in lower-growth countries serve as a signal of stability.
Finally, reverse causality may be the cause of the positive coefficient on the money market
inflows capital control dummy in addition to the positive (yet insignificant) coefficient on
the direct investment capital control dummy. If policymakers impose capital controls in
response to higher capital inflows or if the countries that impose capital controls are the
countries with higher inflows, reverse causality may pose a serious challenge. In the next
section, I apply instrumental variables panel data random effects regression to address the
potential reverse causality and confirm the results hold. When I address the endogeneity
of capital controls, I also show that the coefficient on the direct investment capital control
dummy becomes statistically significant and negative. In the section on sensitivity analysis,
I present the results of Arellano-Bond generalized method of moments estimation.
3.5 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES
As discussed above, reverse causality is a challenge for regression analysis of capital flows (e.g.
direct investment) on policy variables like capital controls11. Extra care must be taken to
capture exogeneous variation in the capital control that is unaffiliated with direct investment
to capture the effect that capital controls have on the level of direct investment inflows.
The same potentially reverse causality is true for other determinants of direct investment,
particularly institutional quality and the level of imports. It is expected that countries with
better institutions attract more direct investment. Conversely, the level of direct investment
can help a country improve its institutions (Alfaro et al., 2005). Imports also exist in
the potentially reverse direction of causality due to import-substituting direct investment.
11I confirm that reverse causality is a mitigating factor in the relationship between foreign direct invest-
ment and capital controls on money market inflows. Results using probit and are available in the Appendix.
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The potential for reverse causality in Equation (1) is addressed with instrumental variables
random effects regression, instrumenting for legal/property rights, imports, and the three
capital controls variables.
Instrumental variables panel data random effects regression obtains coefficient estimates
for the endogenous determinants using variables (instruments) that naturally exhibit exoge-
nous variation. Following Alfaro et al. (2005) and Porta et al. (1998), I use legal origins as in-
struments for institutional quality (legal/property rights). Porta et al. (1998) study the legal
origins of contemporary nation-states as principle determinants in shaping a country’s cur-
rent financial institutions, the associated legislation on investor protection, the enforcement
of such legislation, and the extent of concentration of firm ownership across countries. The
authors show that most countries’ institutions can be traced back to one of four European
legal systems: English common law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian
civil law. Alfaro et al. (2005) adopt these four legal origin variables as exogenous determi-
nants of institutional quality, and find that French legal origin and British legal origin are
significantly predictive. I use French and British legal origins as two instrumental variables
for legal/property rights.
Central bank independence has been cited consistently in the literature on the determi-
nants of capital controls (e.g. B. Johnston and Tamirisa, 1999; Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti,
1995). Central banks which are legally but also operationally more independent are less
likely to impose capital controls. Data on central bank independence is obtained from Gar-
riga (2016), a database on central bank independence that covers 172 countries between
1970 and 2012. The measure of central bank independence is a statutory continuous index
that reflects the level of independence on dimensions of personnel, finance, and policy. I
use central bank independence as an instrument for the capital control on direct investment
inflows. Operational monetary aspects of an economy are not attributes that reflect direct
investment decisions on the margin. From a longer-term perspective, e.g. an examination of
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FDI stocks in cross-section, this may be important for FDI through stable growth. Central
bank independence in this case is important for FDI inflows, only marginally, through fewer
capital controls.
Table 3.4: First Stage Statistics
Excluded Instrument First Stage F Partial–R2
Legal Origins 406.1 .2263
Electoral Cycle 52.15 .026
Right-leaning Government .61 .0003
Central Bank Independence 35.00 .022
Interest Rate Hikes .44 .0003
The next instrument is a binary instrument that captures short-term interest rate hikes
or drops. As a conservative measure, I use quarterly data on changes in the deposit rate
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. To capture large short-term increases
or decreases in the deposit rate, I obtain the annual average of the absolute value of the
quarterly changes in the deposit rate. Interest rate hikes is a binary instrument which is
equal to 1 in years when the annual average is greater than the median annual average. I
use interest rate hikes as an instrument for money market capital controls. Large hikes or
drops in the interest rate over short periods generate the incentives for large capital inflows
or outflows in the form of short-term debt or portfolio flows. Direct investment is a more
restrictive form of external capital, less associated with the forces triggering ‘hot money’ like
short-term debt and portfolio flows. Additionally, the interest rate that is relevant for the
direct investor is the interest rate in their home country because that interest rate is the
best measure of the opportunity cost of the capital invested.
The next two instruments come from the World Bank’s Database on Political Institutions
(Cruz et al., 2016b). Following Giordani et al. (2017), Ghosh et al. (2014), and Grilli and
Milesi-Ferretti (1995), I use an indicator for right-leaning governments and an indicator for
the electoral cycle. The indicator for right-leaning governments serves as an instrument for
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money market inflows capital control dummies. The political leaning of the governing party
is used because right-leaning administrations tend to be less likely to use capital controls.
The Right-leaning Government instrument takes on a within-year GDP-weighted share of all
countries with right-leaning administrations. Finally, I use the electoral cycle of a country
as an instrument for imports. Government expenditures and disposable incomes are well-
documented to increase with the electoral cycle, the same can be reasonably expected of
imports. The electoral cycle takes on a within-year GDP-weighted share of all countries
with legislative or presidential elections in the following year.
The first stage statistics are provided in Table 3.4. The first-stage F -statistic demon-
strates that the legal-origins variables, the electoral cycle, and central bank independence
are not weak instruments. However, the right-leaning government and interest rate hikes
instruments have the typical weak instrument challenges.
Table 3.5 contains the results from the two-stage least squares instrumental variables
random effects estimation. The random effects estimator is the default in this case due to
the time-invariant legal origins instrumental variables. There are two striking results: the
coefficient on both money market capital controls is large at about 2 percentage points,
positive, and statistically significant. Additionally, the coefficient on the direct investment
inflows capital control is large at about 4 percentage points, negative, and statistically sig-
nificant. This contrasts the result on the direct investment capital control in the baseline
regression, suggesting that reverse causality was a challenge and that it is mitigated using
instrumental variables.
The signs and magnitudes remain largely consistent with all previous results. The coef-
ficient on the level of institutional quality is no longer significant. The magnitudes on the
coefficient on the dummy that tracks countries with at least one restriction on money market
inflows is small and insignificant. The results of this regression however are consistent with
Cordella (2003), where a capital control tax has to be high enough to generate the outcome
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Table 3.5: Instrumental Variables Panel Data Random Effects Regression
Dependent Variable: FDI Inflows (1)
One Money Market Control 0.0227
(0.671)
Both Money Market Controls 2.013˚
(1.106)
FDI Inflow Control -4.866˚˚
(2.083)














Country Fixed Effects No






Panel-robust standard errors in parentheses
˚ p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
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that increases capital inflows. This result complements the results in Table 3.5, where capital
controls must be on both money market inflows transactions to increase direct investment
inflows.
The instrumental variables regression is over-identified, so a Sargan-Hansen overidenti-
fication test is possible. The χ2 statistic of 2.48 means that the null hypothesis that the
overidentifying restrictions are valid is not rejected. Finally, a Hausman test confirms in-
strumental variables random effects is the consistent estimator for this model as compared to
the usual panel data random effects estimator. The instrumental variables panel data ran-
dom effects regression addressed the endogeneity of the capital control variables, provided
consistent coefficient estimates, and confirmed that countries that use capital controls on
money market inflows have higher direct investment.
3.6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section, I perform sensitivity analysis in three ways. First, I implement alterna-
tive estimation methodologies to further test the sensitivity of reverse causality. Second, I
re-estimate the instrumental variables specification with alternative determinants of direct
investment that are emphasized in the FDI determinants literature. Finally, I comment on
the relationship between capital controls and short-term debt.
3.6.1 Dynamic Panel
In the previous section, I addressed reverse causality between the dependent variable direct
investment inflows and the capital control variables using instrumental variables panel data
random effects regression. Reverse causality of imports and the level of institutional quality
was also addressed. In this section, I address reverse causality by regressing the dependent
variable on the baseline specification lagged one year and by implementing Arellano-Bond
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generalized method of moments.
Assume that the capital control variables are predetermined in the model if the variables
are independent of all subsequent structural disturbances εt`s for s ě 0. In this case, lagging
the right-hand side of Equation (1) is sufficient for controlling for the reverse causality. If
however serial correlation is present, the assumption that the variables are predetermined
will be violated. Arellano-Bond generalized method of moments is useful in this case, because
it uses lags and lags of differenced terms as instruments for the Arellano-Bond specification.
I show that serial correlation is mitigated using the Arellano-Bond procedure.
Table 3.6 presents the results of fixed effects panel regressions with the right-hand side
of Equation (1) lagged one year in Column (1) and Arellano-Bond generalized method of
moments (GMM) regression in Column (2). The lagged regression estimates the effect of
last year’s money market capital control policy on this year’s direct investment inflows. The
results are largely consistent with the baseline regression. Importantly, the coefficient on one
money market capital control lagged one year is still statistically significant and positive.
However, in this regression, the coefficient on the direct investment inflows capital control
lagged one year is statistically insignificant from zero. Together, these results indicate that
the lagged regression is not sufficient to overcome the problem of reverse causality. The
lagged number of telephone lines becomes statistically significant and positive in the lagged
regression. The lagged value of infrastructure suggests that improved infrastructure leads to
higher FDI with a lag.
The second column of Table 3.6 contains the results of the Arellano-Bond GMM esti-
mates. FDI inflows remains the dependent variable, and lagged FDI inflows enters Equation
3.1 as a right-hand side endogenous explanatory variable. Imports and property rights are
assumed endogenous as well. The growth rate and the interaction of the growth rate with
the capital control variables are assumed predetermined, and the remaining variables enter
the equation lagged (except for distantness, permitted to enter contemporaneously). Level
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Table 3.6: Dynamic Panel Data Regressions
Dependent Variable: FDI Inflows (Fixed Effects) (Arellano-Bond GMM)
Lagged MMI1 (L.MMI1) 0.794˚˚ 1.172˚˚
(0.319) (0.503)
Lagged MMI2 (L.MMI2) 0.0689 0.837
(0.555) (0.574)
Lagged Growth Rate ˆ L.MMI1 -0.137˚˚ -0.0331
(0.0611) (0.0794)
Growth Rate x MMI1 -0.179˚˚
(0.0744)
Lagged Growth Rate ˆ L.MMI2 -0.142˚˚ 0.0108
(0.0664) (0.0901)
Growth Rate x MMI2 -0.243˚˚˚
(0.0861)
Lagged Direct Investment Control 0.00277 0.756
(0.664) (0.759)
Direct Investment Control -0.00901
(0.775)
Lagged FDI Inflows 0.364˚˚˚
(0.0292)
Lagged Gross Fixed Capital Formation 1.019 6.489˚
(5.949) (3.834)








Lagged Telephone Lines 0.0554˚˚ -0.00336
(0.0219) (0.0284)










Country Fixed Effects Yes No







Panel-robust standard errors in parentheses
˚ p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
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lags of the endogenous and predetermined variables are used as instruments. The remaining
right-hand side variables serve as instruments as lagged differences.
The results obtained using the Arellano-Bond generalized method of moments mirror
those obtained through the lagged regression. The coefficient on the money market inflows
capital control remains positive and statistically significant, and the coefficient on the in-
teraction with the growth rate is negative and statistically significant (lagged interaction
is insignificant with the GMM estimation). Thus, countries which use a capital control on
money market inflows have a higher level of direct investment, and this effect is decreasing in
the growth rate. The endogeneity of the capital controls has been addressed in three ways,
and this result has been confirmed in each of the three ways.
The coefficient on the direct investment inflows capital control however remains statisti-
cally insignificant from zero. This may signal that the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation does
not in this case sufficiently account for the reverse causality. The Arellano-Bond test for
autocorrelation confirms that autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors is not a concern
with a test statistic of -16.52 for the first order and 0.687 for the second order. This implies
the second order is not rejected, as expected. However, the overidentification test does reject
the Arellano-Bond GMM instruments as not valid. This outcome could be expected given
our expectation that reverse causality has not been sufficiently mitigated.
3.6.2 Additional Robustness
The literature on the determinants of direct investment describes many attributes that are
important for direct investment inflows. It is possible that other determinants of direct
investment could be important for the relationship between direct investment inflows and
capital controls. For information on additional determinants, I draw on the the sources
that jointly inform the selection of the determinants for the baseline specification: Eicher
et al. (2012); Alfaro et al. (2008); Blonigen (2005). Other determinants that are commonly
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cited include control of corruption, the tariff rate, the level of financial development, and
macroeconomic volatility.
Control of corruption captures the extent to which public power is exercised for private
gain. Control of corruption is an index obtained from the World Governance Indicators
database. Higher values of the control of corruption index represent better outcomes, and
imply lower costs and higher returns for direct investors. Given that direct investment and
international trade are highly integrated, the tariff rate represents an implicit FDI friction.
Stock market capitalization captures the level of financial development (Beck et al., 2000,
2009). Improved access to financing as a result of financial development improves long-
run economic growth and therefore encourages investment (Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000;
Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Levine and Zervos, 1996; Levine, 2001).
Finally, macroeconomic volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the GDP
growth rate for a given country over the sample period. The relationship between capital
controls and direct investment may be influenced by macroeconomic volatility. There exists
asymmetry in volatility outcomes, affecting investment differently in the source country than
in the host country, contributing to ambiguity in the predicted effects on FDI12 (Chenaf-Nicet
and Rougier, 2016).
Table 3.7 contains the results of the first stage statistics for the four alternative instru-
mental variables regressions. The first pair of columns displays the first stage statistics for the
instrumental variables specification with control of corruption in the place of legal/property
rights. The following three pairs of columns provide the first stage statistics with the tariff
rate, macroeconomic volatility, and financial development included among the exogenous
12Additionally, the definition of macroeconomic volatility is distinct from macroeconomic uncertainty.
Macroeconomic volatility measures the variability of an economic series by taking into account all of the
transitory variations of a statistical series. See Cariolle (2012) for an evaluation of the commonly used for
calculating macroeconomic volatility. Macroeconomic uncertainty more specifically intends to measure the
unpredictability of variations in total variability (Aizenman and Pinto, 2004). In any case the evidence tends
to complement the theory suggesting reduced investment under uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
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Table 3.8: Alternative Covariates Instrumental Variables Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
One Money Market Control -0.538 -0.428 0.224 1.130
(0.562) (0.674) (0.773) (0.837)
Both Money Market Controls 1.982˚˚ 2.585˚ 0.793 1.493
(0.932) (1.367) (1.031) (1.301)
FDI Inflows Control -4.093˚˚˚ -6.087˚˚ -3.428 -5.993
(1.479) (2.424) (2.267) (3.814)
Growth Rate 0.118˚˚˚ 0.111˚˚ 0.131˚˚˚ 0.0829˚
(0.0414) (0.0546) (0.0469) (0.0478)
Imports 0.112˚ 0.152˚˚ 0.149˚ 0.196
(0.0581) (0.0709) (0.0813) (0.120)
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 6.158 5.882 2.977 3.323
(6.097) (6.365) (7.369) (9.244)
Telephone Lines -0.0432 0.000647 0.00513 -0.0483
(0.0480) (0.0440) (0.0490) (0.0708)
Exchange Rate -0.272 1.164 2.272 0.904
(2.665) (2.327) (2.155) (2.282)
Legal/Property Rights 0.450 -0.335 1.173
(0.915) (1.039) (1.540)
Distantness -0.00003 0.0002 0.00006 0.0003









Country Fixed Effects No No No No
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 838 738 704 804
Countries 76 75 68 76
Overall R2 0.181 0.155 0.169 0.166
Hausman Statistic 21.08 36.26 13.95 11.12
Sargan Statistic 4.777 5.762 4.782 1.834
Panel-robust standard errors in parentheses
˚ p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
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covariates. The results in Table 3.7 are categorically consistent with the first-stage statistics
presented in Table 3.4. The right-leaning government indicator and the indicator for interest
rate hikes are weak instruments. The partial-R2 of central bank independence and electoral
cycle are improved in the regressions that control for the tariff rate and the level of financial
development, but are also not so high such that they suffer from the “strong instrument”
problem.
Table 3.8 contains the results of the instrumental variables panel data random effects
regression using the alternative determinants of direct investment. The random effects esti-
mator is used in this case because the legal origins instruments in addition to the measure
for macroeconomic volatility are time-invariant. None of the alternative covariates across
(1) through (4) in Table 3.8 are statistically significant. Meanwhile, the results in Columns
(1) and (2) are largely consistent with the instrumental variables results in Table 3.5.
Columns (3) and (4) are different. While consistent in sign, the coefficients on the capital
control variables are no longer statistically significant. This suggests that the influence
that a money market capital control has on direct investment may share components with
the level of financial development or with macroeconomic volatility. Variation in financial
development or volatility might partially explain the relationship between capital controls
and direct investment that we have observed. This is consistent with the notion that countries
with sophisticated capital markets are less likely to benefit from using capital controls. These
variables are not statistically significant thus do not contain predictive power.
3.6.3 Short-term Debt Regression Estimation
The level of foreign direct investment inflows is not the purpose of imposing money mar-
ket inflows capital controls; the purpose of these controls is more likely related to money
market inflows. Evidence that money market inflows decrease with money market inflows
capital controls is therefore highly relevant to the central research question. Analysis using
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Table 3.9: Short-term Debt Panel Data Random Effects Regression
(1)
One Money Market Control (MMI1) 0.338
(0.356)
Both Money Market Controls (MMI2) 0.337
(0.299)
Growth Rate ˆ MMI1 -0.240
(0.171)
Growth Rate ˆ MMI2 -0.209
(0.163)
FDI Inflows Control -0.239
(0.211)














Country Fixed Effects No





Panel-robust standard errors in parentheses
˚ p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
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country-level debt flows is more challenging than with investment flows. Alfaro et al. (2005)
discuss the challenges in estimating the economic consequences of debt flows, highlighting
measurement discrepancies in the debt flows data. Debt flows are also generally influenced
by decisions that are distinct from equity flows. Finally, the sample is much smaller with
only 55 countries reporting.
I re-estimate Equation 3.1 using external short term debt flows as a percent of GDP
for the dependent variable. The quantity of money market capital controls imposed in a
typical economy in addition to the other determinants in the baseline regression remain.
The regression in Table 3.9 is estimated using panel data random effects regression. The
explanatory variables are as expected in sign and significance, except for the capital control
variables which are positive and not significant. This is consistent with the majority of the
literature which finds that capital controls do not influence volume of capital flows (e.g.
Montiel and Reinhart, 1999; Carlson and Hernandez, 2002; Alfaro et al., 2005; Forbes et al.,
2015). The results require some judgment in their interpretation. The influence from equity
flow decisions will impose multicollinearity in this specification, causing the coefficient to be
biased towards zero. Additionally, Alfaro et al. (2005) point out that measurement error in
debt flows data versus changes in the debt stocks data will also cause the coefficients to be
biased towards zero. The smaller sample of countries for which data on debt flows is available
however are countries which are more likely to use capital controls. These countries tend to
be smaller, have lower incomes, but are growing faster13. As such, the coefficient on money
market capital control faces opposing forces.
13For the sample of 55 countries which have data available on short-term debt, mean GDP is $298 billion
USD, mean per capita GDP is $4,142 USD, and the mean GDP growth rate is 2.78%.
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3.7 CONCLUSION
The use of money market inflows capital controls is increasing in frequency, and yet the costs
of using this kind of policy are not fully understood. I have shown that using money market
capital controls do not cost a country its direct investment. In fact, slower-growing countries
that use capital controls on money market inflows expect higher direct investment inflows.
This result is consistent with the interpretation that investors perceive this capital control as
a signal of stability. The contribution of this result is novel for two reasons: (1) the focus on
the response of FDI to a granular level of variation in capital controls, and (2) the finding that
the volume of FDI is increasing with the use of this control. I have put this to result through
multiple scenarios of reverse causality including instrumental variables and Arellano-Bond
GMM, and confirmed that countries that use money market inflows capital controls receive a
higher level of direct investment. Future research should tie down the structural relationship
among capital controls, the growth rate, and direct investment. Future research should also
look into whether other cash flows management policies or other monetary or fiscal policies
that mitigate economic volatility demonstrate the same signal effect. Finally, future work
should determine if this signal can be observed at the firm level and study the experience of
firms under such conditions.
3.8 APPENDIX I
Magud et al. (2018) use the capital asset pricing model to explain the behavior of external
capital flows. The first subsection entails the framework on short-term flows developed in
Magud et al. (2018). In the second subsection, I extend the framework to shift the perspective
to long-term flows and characterize the relationship between long-term flows and a capital
control imposed on short-term flows.
CHAPTER 3. RESTRICTIONS ON SHORT-TERM CAPITAL INFLOWS 118
There are two different categories (maturities) of external capital flows: short-term flows
St and long-term flows Lt, which together make up total capital flows Ft. Short-term capital
flows can be expressed as a share x of total capital flows: xFt. The interest rate for short-term
capital flows is r˚ and the interest rate for long-term flows, r. The variance for short-term




In Magud et al. (2018), a representative investor maximizes expected utility of wealth given
her risk preferences. This means that the representative investor will trade off risk (variance)
σ2w for expected return w on the portfolio of external capital flows. Expected return on total
capital flows can be expressed as
w “ p1` rqFt ` pr
˚
´ rqxFt. (3.2)
The second term on the right-hand side represents the premium attributed to short-term





p1´ xq2σ2r ` x
2σ2r˚ ` 2xp1´ xqσrr˚
‰
. (3.3)
A position in which x “ 1 implies that all external capital flows are in short-term capital.
This is all high risk, high return. The contradistinction x “ 0 implies that all external
capital flows are in long-term capital which is lower risk, and lower return. We solve for
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where Φ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and α is the share of short-term external











Suppose that we impose a capital control on short-term external capital flows. The capital
control can be represented by a tax τ which drives a wedge between the rents paid for short-
term capital by the domestic borrower and the return received by the international lender.
We can redefine r˚ as the after-capital-controls return on short-term external capital flows:
p1` r˚q “ p1` r˚
1
qp1´ τq. (3.7)
As Equation 3.7 indicates, a capital control in the form of a positive tax will decrease the
return on short-term capital flows. All else equal, this kind of capital control policy implies
















thus, a decrease in the return on short-term capital flows r˚ implies a decrease in the optimal
share of short-term capital flows x.
Aggregation over investors j with wealth Wj implies demand for short term flows
ř
j xjWj
and total wealth W “
ř
j Wj. In equilibrium, total supply of short-term flows V
˚, should
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We can characterize the aggregation by multiplying through Equation 3.5 by Wj. This yields,
with some manipulation:












is redefined to represent aggregate risk aversion.
In aggregate, the share of short-term capital flows falls with the use of a capital control:
dr˚
dpV ˚{W q
“ Φσ ą 0. (3.11)






2 ă 0 (3.12)
Magud et al. (2018) totally differentiate Equation 3.10 with respect to V ˚ and W to
further investigate the way the levels of capital flows change with the use of capital controls:
dr˚ “ σΦ
„





Equation 3.13 is expression that describes how changes in short-term capital flows and total
capital flows contribute to changes in the short-term interest rate. The authors elaborate
on this relationship with the objective of identifying the elasticity of short-term flows with
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pη ´ 1q (3.15)
Equation 3.14 is an expression for the way changes in the supply of short-term capital flows
influence marginal returns on short-term capital flows, as a function of the elasticity of short-
term capital flows with respect to total capital flows. Intuitively, this is expected: elasticity
reflects the rate at which marginal returns are changing. Where η ą 1, marginal returns are
increasing in the level of short-term capital flows. A decrease in the return on capital flows
due to a capital control τ is therefore met by a decrease in the level of short-term capital
flows. If η “ 1, marginal returns are constant and capital flows do not change in response to
a capital control. When 0 ă η ă 1, marginal returns are decreasing in the level of short-term
capital flows. In this case, optimal capital flow behavior is to expand given an additional
decrease in the return on short-term capital flows, i.e. from a capital control tax τ . The
intuition here is that investors now require a larger quantity of capital invested to earn the
same return. The key point is that for the desired outcome of capital control policy to work,
the elasticity between short-term flows and total flows should be greater than 1.
Long-term flows
We are interested in the way that a capital control on short-term flows influences long-
term flows with respect to total flows. I extend the framework of Magud et al. (2018) to
characterize this relationship. Following Equation 3.5 in the Appendix, the share of long-
term flows in total flows are given by:
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The share of long-term flows as written in Expression 3.16 depends on the optimal share of
short-term flows. Aggregation over investors j with wealth Wj gives the demand for long-
term flows
ř
jp1´xjqWj. In equilibrium, the total supply of long-term flows Q
˚ should equal





We can characterize the aggregation by multiplying through Equation 3.16 by Wj. This
yields with some manipulation:








We can totally differentiate to discern how the return on short-term flows changes with



































p1´ ξq . (3.21)
Equations 3.20 and 3.21 are conditions which characterize the response of long-term
capital flows and total capital flows to a change in the after-tax return on short-term capital
flows, and depend on the value of the exogenous parameter, elasticity ξ.
When the elasticity ξ ą 1, marginal returns of long-term flows with respect to total flows
CHAPTER 3. RESTRICTIONS ON SHORT-TERM CAPITAL INFLOWS 123
are increasing and imply vis-a-vis Equations 3.20 and 3.21 that the marginal returns of short-
term flows are decreasing. In this case, a capital control on short-term flows τ (implying
a decrease in r˚) leads to an expansion of long-term and total capital flows. When ξ ă 1,
marginal returns of long-term flows are decreasing and Equations 3.20 and 3.21 are positive.
In this case, the capital control implies an decrease in the level of long-term and total flows.
3.9 APPENDIX II
Table 3.10: Probit Regression: Change in Money Market Controls
(1) (2)
Lagged FDI Inflows -0.0204˚ -0.0155
(0.0107) (0.0150)


















The dependent variable is equal to one if there exists a change in money market restrictions in a
given year and is zero otherwise. Robust Standard errors in parentheses
˚ p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
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Table 3.11: Multinomial Logit: Increase or Decrease in Money Market Controls
(1) (2)
Outcome: Increase Money Market Controls:
Lagged FDI Inflows 0.0180 0.0665˚˚
(0.0233) (0.0331)














FDI Inflows Control -0.470
(0.380)
Outcome: Reduce Money Market Controls:
Lagged FDI Inflows -0.00833 0.0196
(0.0315) (0.0485)


















: The dependent variable is either one of the listed outcomes, no change in money market controls
is the numeraire. Standard errors in parentheses
˚ p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
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Table 3.12: Probit Regression: Change in Money Market Controls
(1) (2)
Lagged Short-term Debt 0.004 -0.023
(0.001) (0.024)
















The dependent variable is equal to one if there exists a change in money market restrictions in a
given year and is zero otherwise. Robust Standard errors in parentheses
˚ p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
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Table 3.13: Multinomial Logit: Increase or Decrease in Money Market Controls
(1) (2)
Outcome: Reduce Money Market Controls:
Lagged Short-term Debt 0.006 .013
(0.029) (0.034)














Outcome: Increase Money Market Controls:
Lagged Short-term Debt 0.01 -0.169˚˚
(0.025) (0.067)
















: The dependent variable is either one of the listed outcomes, no change in money market controls
is the numeraire. Standard errors in parentheses
˚ p ă 0.10, ˚˚ p ă 0.05, ˚˚˚ p ă 0.01
CHAPTER 3. RESTRICTIONS ON SHORT-TERM CAPITAL INFLOWS 127
Table 3.14: Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Name Definition and Source
Aggregate Control Aggregate controls index covering the remaining 8 asset
categories tracked in Fernández et al. (2015), excluding money
market controls and direct investment controls.
Capital Formation Gross fixed capital formation as a percent of GDP. Land
improvements, equipment purchases, construction of
infrastructure, public, private, commercial, and industrial
buildings. Source: World Bank national accounts data, and
OECD National Accounts data files.
Central Bank Independence Statutory continuous index which reflects the level of
independence on dimensions of personnel, finance, and policy.
Source: Garriga (2016).
Control of Corruption Index which captures the extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain in addition to state capture.
Countries which have higher values of the control of corruption
index represent better outcomes. Source: World Governance
Indicators, World Bank
Distantness GDP weighted average of the distance between the capital city
in a country and the capital city of all other countries. Distance
is weighted by the proportion of the country’s population
residing in the capital city. Source: Gurevich and Herman
(2018).
Electoral Cycle GDP weighted share of the countries which have an election in
the next year. Source: World Bank Database of Political
Institutions.
Exchange Rate
The exchange rate is the year over year percent change in the
price level ratio of the purchasing power parity conversion
factor of GDP to a market exchange rate. Source: World Bank,
International Comparison Program database.
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Variable Name Definition and Source
FDI Net foreign direct investment inflows as a percent of GDP.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and Balance of
Payments Databases
Growth Rate Annual difference in the log of real GDP per capita,
Source:World Bank national accounts data, and OECD
National Accounts data files.
Imports Imports of goods and services as a percent of GDP. Source:
World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National
Accounts data files.
Interest Rate Hikes
Dummy variable that equals for a given country and year when
the annual average of the absolute value of the quarterly
changes in the deposit rate is greater than the median in a
given country and year. Source: International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics and data files.
Legal Origins
Dummy variables equal to one of a given country has French or
English legal origins. Source: Porta et al. (1998).
Legal/Property Rights Legal system and property rights pertains to the protection of
persons and their rightfully acquired property. Source:
Gwartney et al. (2016).
Market Capitalization Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the
share price times the number of shares outstanding (including
their several classes) for listed domestic companies, as a
percentage of GDP. Source: World Bank, World Federation of
Exchanges Database.
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Variable Name Definition and Source
MMI1
Dummy variable, equals 1 if a given country has restrictions
either on resident or non-resident transactions that result in
inflows of money market funds. Source: Fernández et al. (2015).
MMI2
Dummy variable, equals 1 if a given country has restrictions on
both resident and non-resident transactions that result in
inflows of money market funds. Source: Fernández et al. (2015).
Political Affiliation GDP weighted share of the countries where the political party
with majority control is right-wing in a given year. Source:
World Bank Database of Political Institutions.
SD Cycle The standard deviation of the cycle isolated by the
Hodrick-Prescott filter on the log of real GDP. Source: World
Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts
data files.
SD GDP Growth
The standard deviation of quarterly GDP for a given country
over the sample period. Source: World Bank national accounts
data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
SD Residual
The standard deviation of the residual of an ARIMA(3,1,2)
regression of the log of Real GDP. Source: World Bank national
accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
Short-term Debt Net flows on external short-term debt as a percent of GDP.
Debt with an original maturity of one year or less. Source:
World Bank, International Debt Statistics.
Tariff Rate Simple mean applied tariff is the unweighted average of
effectively applied rates for all products subject to tariffs
calculated for all traded goods. Source: World Bank staff
estimates using the WITS system based on data from the
UNCTAD TRAINS database and the WTO IDB and CTS
database.
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Figure 3.4: Change in Money Market Inflows Capital Controls
The positive frequencies in Figure 3.4 for the three different shades of blue represent
the three distinct ways one country can add restrictions on short-term capital inflows in
a given year, the negative frequencies in three shades of purple represent the three distinct
ways one country can remove restrictions on short-term capital inflows in a given year. Thus,
blues represent country-year capital control additions, purples represent country-year capital
control removals.
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